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In Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland, Alice wandered through
Wonderland encountering a variety of strange characters as she
sought her way home. At one point, Alice met the Cheshire Cat in
the woods:
"Cheshire-Puss," [Alice] began ... "Would you tell me, please,
which way I ought to go from here?"
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the
Cat.
"I don't much care where-" said Alice.
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat.
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"-so long as I get somewhere," Alice added as an explanation.
"Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long
enough."
Alice felt that this could not be denied, so she tried another question. "What sort of people live about here?"
"In that direction," the Cat said, waving its right paw round, "lives
a Hatter: and in that direction," waving the other paw, "lives a
March Hare. Visit either you like: they're both mad."'

Like Alice, we want to know which way we ought to go when
deciding cases arising in our legal system. Instead of the Cheshire
Cat, we look to the United States Supreme Court for directions.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we should be able to use the
Court's prior decisions as a road map in deciding future cases.2
The directions the Court gives depend, as the Cheshire Cat
pointed out to Alice, "a good deal on where you want to get to."
As in many other areas, each of the Supreme Court's civil rights
decisions is classified by the popular press, by lawyers, and by academics as either a "plaintiff's victory" or a "defendant's victory."
By this classification we mean that the Supreme Court has given us
directions in a particular case that make it more likely that either
plaintiffs or defendants will prevail in future cases.3 Thus a case
such as Monroe v. Pape4 which held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is available to challenge allegedly unconstitutional police searches and
seizures even if state law prohibits the police officer's action, is
viewed as a "plaintiff's case."'5 On the other hand, a case such as

1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 41 (Castle Books 1978) (1865).
2. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1949) (describing use of precedent). Cf JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS AND OTHER WRITINGS
203 (R. Quintana, ed., 1958) (1726), quoted in WILLIAM P. STATSKY & R. JOHN WERNET,
JR., CASE ANALYSIS & FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL WRITING 3 (3d ed. 1989):
It is a Maxim that among these Lawyers, that whatever hath been done before may
legally be done again: and therefore they take special Care to record all the Decisions
formerly made against common Justice and the general Reason of Mankind. These,
under the Name of Precedents, they produce as Authorities, to justify the most iniquitous Opinions; and the Judges never fail of directing accordingly.
Id.
3. A case may also be classified as a "defendant's victory" when it decreases the likelihood that putative plaintiffs will file lawsuits in the future.
4. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on othergrounds by Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
5. Section 1983 provides:
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Parrattv. Taylor,6 which held that a prisoner could not bring suit
under Section 1983 when a state prison official negligently lost the
prisoner's personal property and when the state provided adequate
postdeprivation remedies, is commonly viewed as a "defendant's
case."
There is, of course, much truth in these popular perceptions of
these cases. There is no doubt that Monroe greatly expanded the
availability of Section 1983, while Parratt restricted the types of
claims that could be brought under that statute. But this popular
perception oversimplifies a complex situation. Sometimes a case
perceived as a "plaintiff's victory" ends up as a "defendant's victory." While the Supreme Court claims it is telling us how to get to
the March Hare's house, we somehow end up at the Mad Hatter's.
Zinermon v. Burch7 is one such decision. Mr. Burch alleged his
admission to a Florida mental health facility violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.' Although Mr. Burch alleged he was deprived of his liberty without a predeprivation
hearing, the district court concluded that he could not bring a SecEvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 does not itself create any substantive rights; it only
creates a remedy for violations of rights provided under the Constitution and some federal
statutes. Wilson v. Garcfa, 471 U.S. 261, 278 (1985). The plaintiffs in Monroe used § 1983
to remedy an alleged violation of their right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. This guarantee, found in the Fourth Amendment, applies to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171.
6. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
7. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
8. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
U.S. Co sT. amend. XIV. §§ 1. 5.

19931

ESCAPING SECTION 1983 WONDERLAND

tion 1983 claim because, as in Parratt, state law provided
postdeprivation remedies.9
An Eleventh Circuit panel initially affirmed the dismissal, noting
that the alleged deprivation was contrary to state law. 10 On rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court," and
the United States Supreme Court affirmed. 2 Citing Monroe v.
Pape for the now well-established proposition that "[i]t is no an' 3
swer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief,'
the Court then noted the limited applicability of Parratt: "Parrattis
not an exception to the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, but
rather an application of that test to the unusual case in which one
of the variables in the Mathews equation-the value of predeprivation safeguards-is
negligible in preventing the kind of deprivation
14
at issue.'
If Parratt is an unusual case, then most cases decided after
Zinermon should permit plaintiffs to proceed with their Section
1983 procedural due process claims, even if the defendants acted
contrary to state law and even if postdeprivation state-law remedies are available.' 5 Notwithstanding the Court's direction in
Zinermon, as described in Part III below, most lower courts have
refused to permit plaintiffs to bring a Section 1983 procedural due
process claim when the defendant acts contrary to state law or
when there are postdeprivation state-law remedies available. This
seemingly implausible result is possible only because, as described
9. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 130 n.15.
10. Burch v. Appalachee Community Mental Health Servs., Inc., 804 F.2d 1549, 1557
(11th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 840 F.2d 797 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, Zinermon v. Burch,
494 U.S. 113 (1990).
11. Burch v. Appalachee Community Mental Health Servs., Inc., 840 F.2d 797, 803
(11th Cir. 1988) (en banc), affd, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
12. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 139.
13. Id. at 124. The Zinermon court continued, "The federal remedy is supplementary
to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal
one is invoked." Id. (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183).
14. Id. at 129 (emphasis added). Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), identified
three factors that must be considered in determining whether due process has been satisfied: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the interest and the probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest. Id. at 335.
15. See Mathias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1056 (5th Cir.) (reasoning that Parrattapplies only in cases in which predeprivation safeguards have negligible value in preventing
deprivation), modified on other grounds, 915 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
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below in Parts II and IV, the Court has given contradictory directions in Zinermon. These contradictory directions violate basic
principles of judicial decision making and ensure that potential
plaintiffs and potential defendants will be unable to rely on prior
cases to decide how to conduct themselves in the present and in the
future.'6 Like the Cheshire Cat, the Supreme Court is not telling
us "which way [we] ought to go from here."
It has not always been so. At the time the St. Mary's Law Journal published its inaugural issue, the Supreme Court consistently
directed that Section 1983 claims be permitted regardless of the
legality of the challenged action under state law or the availability
of state remedies. For example, in McNeese v. Board of Education 17 the plaintiffs sued under Section 1983, alleging the operation
of racially segregated schools. The Illinois school district asserted
that segregation was illegal under Illinois law 18 and that a state
remedy was available.' 9 Reminding the school board that the
Monroe Court held that state remedies need not be exhausted,2 °
the Supreme Court in McNeese rejected any suggestion that Section 1983 does not reach action that is illegal under state law: "It is
immaterial whether respondents' conduct is legal or illegal as a
' 21
matter of state law."
Today, the lower courts find themselves in a Section 1983 Wonderland of conflicting directions about how to decide Section 1983
procedural due process cases 22 brought against defendants whose
16. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991), overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (describing
stare decisis as "the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process").
17. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
18. See McNeese, 373 U.S. at 670 (noting that both Illinois Constitution and Illinois
School Code prohibited racial segregation).
19. See id. (noting that Illinois School Code permitted 50 residents of school district or
10% of residents, whichever is less, to file complaint with Illinois Superintendent of Public
Instruction alleging that pupil had been segregated in school on account of race).
20. Id. at 671.
21. Id. at 674.
22. While this confusion is generated by the Supreme Court's decisions in cases
brought under § 1983 that alleged a procedural due process violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the use of the Legalist Model described below, which creates the confusion,
could be extended to other § 1983 claims. Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v.
Burch, FederalRights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY
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actions were illegal under state law, or when state law provides a
post-deprivation remedy. This confusion stems from the Court's
use in Zinermon v. Burch of two contradictory models of Section
1983. In Part I of this Article, I trace the development of the Governmental Model (exemplified by Monroe) and the Legalist Model
23 In Part II, I describe how Zinermon
(exemplified by Parratt).
uses both the Governmental and Legalist Models in the same opinion. In Part III, I summarize how the lower courts have applied
Zinermon, and demonstrate the confusion that has resulted from
the use of the two contradictory models in Zinermon. In Part IV, I
describe how certain lower courts, in a seemingly impossible task,
have made Parrattthe regular rule, rather than the "unusual" case
described in Zinermon. In Part V, I describe the rationalizations
used to support the continued use of Parratt'sLegalist Model as the
standard for deciding Section 1983 procedural due process cases,
and why those rationalizations are faulty. Finally, in Part VI, I propose a revision of the standards set out in Zinermon v. Burch. This
revision seeks to give the lower courts directions to escape the Section 1983 Wonderland, to return consistency to judicial interpretation of the statute, and to address the fears of the Legalist Model's
advocates.
I.

A.

THE LEGALIST AND GOVERNMENTAL MODELS

The Legalist Model

Professors Larry Alexander and Paul Horton describe the
United States Supreme Court's contradictory approaches to Section 1983 as following either a "Legalist Model" or a "Governmental Model."2 4 The "defendants' cases" use the Legalist Model. The
L.J. 1, 75 (1991) (discussing danger that "random and unauthorized" conduct test might be
applied to other kinds of constitutional violations).
23. These labels were created by Professors Larry Alexander and Paul Horton.
LARRY ALEXANDER & PAUL HORTON, WHOM DOES THE CONSTITUTION COMMAND?

13-

15, 63-64, 69-70 (1988), cited in Larry Alexander, ConstitutionalTorts, the Supreme Court,
and the Law of Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 576,
576 n.4 (1993). Cf.Daniel S. Feder, From Parratt to Zinermon Authorization, Adequacy,
and Immunity in a Systematic Analysis of State Procedure,11 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 84748 (1990) (describing Parrattas "systemic" analysis).
24. LARRY ALEXANDER & PAUL HORTON, WHOM DOES THE CONSTITUTION COMMAND? 13-15, 63-64, 69-70 (1988), cited in Larry Alexander, Constitutional Torts, the

Supreme Court, and the Law of Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87
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Legalist Model imposes duties only on government officials who
act as lawmakers. If these state and local lawmakers have enacted
laws that forbid infringement of constitutionally protected rights
and seek to prevent such infringements, then there is no violation
of Section 1983. The Legalist Model asks whether state laws are
constitutionally adequate. If there is an adequate state law, then
the plaintiff cannot bring a Section 1983 claim, and must instead
rely on state-law claims heard, in most cases, in state court.2 5
The Legalist Model has a seemingly well-established pedigree. It
was used in some of the earliest cases alleging violations of rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Barney v. City of New
York, 26 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who sought to enjoin construction of a subway next to his property on Park Avenue
could not allege a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because
he also alleged that the subway construction was illegal under New
York state law. The Court reasoned that if the construction was
illegal under state law, there could not be any "state action" for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 27 The Court's unanimous opinion quoted Justice Bradley's opinion in the infamous Civil Rights
Cases:
[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against
state aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or
judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual,
unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a
crime of that individual; . . . [the plaintiff's] rights remain in full
force, and may presumably
be vindicated by resort to the laws of the
28
state for redress.
Nw. U. L. REV. 576, 576 nn.4 & 7 (1993). Part I of this Article is based on Professor
Alexander's description of the development of the Legalist and Governmental Models.
25. Id. at 576-77. These state-law claims could be heard in federal court if the court
has diversity subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
26. 193 U.S. 430 (1904).
27. Barney, 193 U.S. at 437. Cases discussing the issue of "state action" under the
Fourteenth Amendment are relevant to the separate, but obviously related, issue of
whether there is action "under color of" state law under § 1983. See Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939-42 (1982) (discussing relationship between these two concepts).
28. Barney, 193 U.S. at 439 (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883)).
The Court in the Civil Rights Cases held that §§ 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
were not authorized by the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments because that statute
prohibited racial discrimination by private actors, rather than by state actors. Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 14. The claims in the Civil Rights Cases all involved racial discrimination
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9

Barney is a classic application of the Legalist model.2 9 Mr. Barney
did not allege that the New York state laws were constitutionally
by private actors. Id. at 13-14. Two defendants had allegedly denied accommodations in
an inn on racial grounds. Id. at 4. One defendant had allegedly denied an African-American a seat at a San Francisco theater, while another defendant had allegedly refused to seat
someone at the Grand Opera House in New York. Id. A fifth defendant had allegedly
refused to permit an African-American woman to ride in the ladies' car of a train. Id. at 45.
29. Barney's selective quotation from the Civil Rights Cases suggests that the Legalist
Model had been used since at least 1883. Cf. Barney, 193 U.S. at 439 (noting that private
act of individual, unless in some way sanctioned by or authorized by state authority, is not
subject to constitutional oversight). When the Civil Rights Cases refers to the "wrongful
acts of individuals," such reference is to racial discrimination by private parties. Id. the
Civil Rights Cases did not involve an act by an agent or employee of the state, and the
Court in that decision recognized with approval the use of the Governmental Model in Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). In Ex parte Virginia a Virginia county judge had been
indicted for illegally excluding African-Americans from juries in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 340-41. The Ex parte Virginia
Court applied the Governmental Model, finding that the illegal actions of the judge were
exerted in exercise of his public position. Id. at 348. As such, the actions of the judge
represented actions of the State. Id. See discussion in Part I.B below.
The only decisions cited in Barney that used the Legalist Model to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment were Circuit Court opinions. Barney, 193 U.S. at 440 (citing In re
Storti, 109 F. 807 (C.C.D. Mass. 1901) (holding Fourteenth Amendment is inapplicable
where state legislature has done its duty); Kiernan v. Multnomah County, 95 F. 849
(C.C.D. Or. 1899) (concluding Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state legislation and does
not refer to action by private individuals); Manhattan Ry. Co. v. City of New York, 18 F.
195 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883) (action by state officials that is not in conformity with state statutes cannot be imputed to state for Fourteenth Amendment purposes).
Barney also cited prior Supreme Court cases interpreting the Eleventh Amendment in
which the Court distinguished between acts of state officers with lawful right and acts of
officers without lawful right. Barney, 193 U.S. at 439-40. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), the Supreme Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit the
federal courts from enjoining state officials who "are clothed with some duty in regard to
the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten and are about to commence
proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unId. at 156. Ex parte Young
constitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution ......
emphasized the illegality of the state official's act under the United States Constitution, not
the legality of the state official's act under state law. Id. at 152, 156-58 (distinguishing
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891) and Fitz v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899),
cited in Barney). While Ex parte Young held the Eleventh Amendment did not bar injunctive relief against a state official's enforcement of a statute valid under state law but alleged
to be invalid under the federal Constitution, this principle was expanded in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913) (discussed in Part
I.B.1). In Home Telephone, the defendant argued that the state official's action would
violate the California Constitution if it violated the federal Constitution. The Home Telephone Court cited to Ex parte Young, 227 U.S. at 293, and concluded that a state official
engages in state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes even if the action violates
state law. Id. at 283-84 (finding that defendant's argument was so clearly in conflict with

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

inadequate. New York's lawmakers had enacted laws that protected him. Therefore, the solution for Mr. Barney was to ask the
New York state courts to enforce New York state law.3°
B.

The Governmental Model
1. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles

Barney was decided in 1904. From 1909 to 1912, President Taft
filled six vacancies on the Supreme Court. 31 This new majority on
the Supreme Court resurrected the other available model, the
Governmental Model. If the Legalist Model focuses on lawmaking, the Governmental Model focuses on lawbreaking. The Governmental Model imposes duties on more than state and local
lawmakers; it imposes duties on all government officials and
agents. Under the Governmental Model, it doesn't matter whether
the state and local lawmakers have forbidden the infringement of
constitutional rights, or have attempted to provide a remedy for
such infringements. What matters is whether any state official has
infringed the plaintiff's constitutionally protected interests. If the
state and local lawmakers have enacted laws prohibiting such infringements, plaintiffs are free under the Governmental Model,
just as they are under the Legalist Model, to sue on the state-law
claims in state court. However, under the Governmental Model,
plaintiffs may also sue under Section 1983 in either state or federal
court,32 even when the state's lawmakers have sought to prevent
the violation of constitutional rights.33

precedent as to leave no doubt that plain error was committed in applying it in the lower
courts). After the decisions in Ex parte Young and Home Telephone, a state officer "is
stripped of state authority solely for purposes of Eleventh Amendment analysis, a result
that does not affect the determination of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment."
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIcTION 347 (1989).
30. See Larry Alexander, Constitutional Torts, the Supreme Court, and the Law of
Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 576, 580 (1993)
(describing Barney's application of Legalist Model).
31. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 975
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
32. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear § 1983 claims. See Howlett v.
Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990) (holding that Florida state court must hear § 1983 claim).
33. Larry Alexander, ConstitutionalTorts, the Supreme Court, and the Law of Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 576, 577 (1993)
(describing Governmental Model).
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In those cases in which no adequate state-law remedy exists, the
outcome is the same under both the Legalist and the Governmental Models. Under each model, a Section 1983 claim can be
brought when the state's lawmakers have failed to prohibit the infringement of constitutional rights under state law. The model
used to interpret Section 1983 matters only in those cases in which
it is alleged that the defendant's action was illegal under state law
or that there is an adequate state-law remedy available to the
plaintiff. The paradigmatic example of the Governmental Model is
Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles,34 decided
in 1913 by the new Taft-appointed majority on the Supreme Court.
The Court held unanimously that a California rate-setting ordinance represented state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, even though the defendant argued that if the ordinance
violated the United States Constitution it would also violate California law. Under the Legalist Model, the claim in Home Telephone could never have been brought because there were adequate
state-law remedies: the plaintiffs in Home Telephone could have
sued in the California state courts for violations of the Due Process
Clause of the California Constitution. Under the Governmental
Model, however, the plaintiffs could bring a Section 1983 claim.35
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Legalist Model:
[Tihe theory of the [Fourteenth] Amendment is that where an officer
or other representative of a State in the exercise of the authority
with which he is clothed misuses the power possessed to do a wrong
forbidden by the Amendment, inquiry concerning whether the state
has authorized the wrong is irrelevant and the Federal judicial power
is competent to afford redress for the wrong 36by dealing with the officer and the result of his exertion of power.
The Court thus found "state action" even though state law explicitly prohibited the action. For the Home Telephone Court, this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was rooted in
pragmatic realities:

34. 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
35. Larry Alexander, Constitutional Torts, the Supreme Court, and the Law of Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 576, 581 (1993)
(describing application of Governmental Model in Home Telephone).
36. Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at 287.
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[A] state officer cannot, on the one hand, as a means of doing a
wrong forbidden by the [Fourteenth] Amendment, proceed upon the
assumption of the possession of state power, and at the same time,
the Amendment, deny
for the purpose of avoiding the application of
37
the power, and thus accomplish the wrong.
The Home Telephone Court then cited Virginia v. Rives,38 a case
decided three years before The Civil Rights Cases.3 9 In Rives, an

African-American criminal defendant challenged the exclusion of
African-Americans from jury service. The state statute gave all
persons equal rights to serve on juries, but the court officials applied the nondiscriminatory statute in a discriminatory manner.
Under the Legalist Model, the plaintiff's claim would not be valid.
But in Rives the Supreme Court, while concluding that Congress
had not authorized the removal of the case from the Virginia state
court to the federal courts, rejected the Legalist argument that
Congress could never authorize the federal courts to hear such a
case.4 0 Rives broadly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to
authorize holding a state liable even if the state's lawmakers are
not defendants, for the state acts through "its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities."41
The Home Telephone Court also cited Ex parte Virginia.42 In Ex
parte Virginia, the Court denied a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by a Virginia state judge who was prosecuted under
Section 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 for excluding all AfricanAmericans from a jury list. 43 As in Rives, the statute was nondis37. Id. at 288.
38. 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
39. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
40. Rives, 100 U.S. at 319 (stating that Congress could have authorized removal into
federal courts at any time during proceedings, whenever state-court ruling denied equal
protection of laws).
41. Id. at 318.
42. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
43. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 349. In Ex parte Virginia, the Court quoted § 4 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which provided:
No citizen, possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law
shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United
States, or of any State, on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude;
and any officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning
of jurors who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the cause aforesaid shall,
on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be fined not more
than $5,000.
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criminatory, but the state judge applied the statute in a discriminatory fashion. In denying the petition, the Court used the
Governmental Model to determine whether the judge's actions,
which violated state law, could nonetheless be attributed to the
state for purposes of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment:
A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. [The Fourteenth Amendment] must
mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by
whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public
position under a State government, deprives another of property, life,

or liberty, without due process of law, or denies or takes away the
equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition;
and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the
State's power, his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the con-

stitutional prohibition has no meaning. Then the State has clothed
one of its agents with power to annul or to evade it.
... Such legislation must act upon persons, not upon the abstract
thing denominated a State, but upon the persons who are the agents of
the State in the denial of the rights which were intended to be
secured.44

The Home Telephone Court also cited a third case decided
before the Civil Rights Cases. In Neal v. Delaware,45 an AfricanAmerican unsuccessfully sought the removal of his state-court
criminal prosecution to the federal court because African-Americans had been excluded as jurors. A Delaware statute allowed
only qualified voters to serve as jurors.46 Although the Delaware
Constitution, adopted in 1831, restricted the right to vote to
"white" citizens, the Court agreed with Delaware's assertion that
this provision had been automatically voided by the adoption of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.47 The Court therefore
Id. at 344.
44. Id. at 347 (emphasis added).
45. 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
46. Neal, 103 U.S. at 388.
47. Id. at 387-89. The Fifteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
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concluded that the case could not be removed to the federal
court. ' 8 The Court nonetheless reversed the state court's judgment
against the defendant because Delaware state officials continued to
exclude African-Americans from juries even though this was in violation of state law as amended automatically by the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. Although state law did not authorize
the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race, the "action of those
49
officers in the premises is to be deemed the act of the State .... ,"
The Home Telephone Court recognized that the Governmental
Model had been used in the first interpretations of the post-Civil
War amendments and statutes. Rives, Ex parte Virginia, and Neal
emphasized the liability of all government officials and agents, not
just that of a state's lawmakers. It is the Governmental Model, not
the Legalist Model manufactured in Barney v. City of New York, °
that framed the Supreme Court's initial understanding of the postCivil War amendments and statutes.

U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
48. Neal, 103 U.S. at 392-93. Removal had been sought under § 641 of the Revised
Statutes, which provided in pertinent part:
When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in any State court, for any
cause whatsoever, against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the judicial
tribunals of the State, or in the part of the State, where such suit or prosecution is
pending, any right secured to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of the
citizens of the United States, . . . such suit or prosecution may, upon the petition of
such defendant, filed in said State Court, at any time before the trial or final hearing of
the cause, stating the facts and verified by oath, be removed, for trial, into the next
circuit court to be held in the district where it is pending. Upon the filing of such
petition all further proceedings in the State Court shall cease ....
18 Stat. 114, 114 (1875) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1988)).
49. Neal, 103 U.S. at 397.
50. 193 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1904). The Civil Rights Cases, cited by Barney as authority
for the application of the Legalist Model, involved discrimination by private parties. The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1883). No agent or employee of the state engaged in
wrongdoing in violation of state law. Id. When the majority opinion in the Civil Rights
Cases discussed such wrongdoing, it recognized the Court's application of the Governmental Model in Ex parte Virginia:
Whether the statute-book of the State actually laid down any such rule of disqualification [for jurors based on race], or not, the State, through its officer, enforced such a
rule: and it is against such state action, through its officers and agents, that the last
clause of the section is directed.
Id. at 15 (emphasis added). Justice Harlan agreed with this characterization of Ex parte
Virginia in his dissent to the Civil Rights Cases. Id. at 57-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting
Ex parte Virginia's rejection of the argument that there was no state action because the
"law of the State did not authorize or permit" the discrimination).
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United States v. Classic and Screws v. United States

The Supreme Court affirmed the Governmental Model in United
States v. Classic5 and in Screws v. United States.52 In Classic, elections commissioners were charged under Sections 19 and 20 of the
Federal Criminal Code 53 with depriving voters of their right to vote
by altering, falsely counting, and certifying primary-election ballots. These actions were contrary to Louisiana law. 4 Interpreting
the term "under color of [state] law" found in Section 20, the Court
used the Governmental Model and concluded that the officials
could be charged under that section: "Misuse of power, possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law, is action taken
' 55
'under color of' state law."

In Screws the Court held that Georgia law enforcement officials
could be prosecuted under Section 20 of the Federal Criminal
Code for criminal civil rights violations when they beat an AfricanAmerican in their custody so severely that he died. Although this
51. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
52. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
53. Section 19 as interpreted in Classic provided:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen
in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same,
or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another,
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
so secured, they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars and imprisoned not
more than ten years, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or
place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.
Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 19, 35 Stat. 1092, 1092 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1988)).
Section 20 as interpreted in Classic provided:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom willfully
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race,
than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than one
thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 20, 35 Stat. 1092, 1092 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1988)) (emphasis added).
54. See Classic, 313 U.S. at 12 n.1 (describing Louisiana election laws).
55. Id. at 325-26.
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misdeed was prohibited by Georgia state law, 56 the Court held that
the federal courts could be given power by Congress to hear the
prosecution. Screws thus adopted the Governmental Model.57
3.

Monroe v. Pape

While Classic and Screws were not Section 1983 cases, they interpreted a post-Civil War criminal statute that, like Section 1983, addressed actions taken under color of state law. The Monroe v.
Pape Court enthusiastically adopted this reasoning, holding that a
Section 1983 cause of action could be brought, notwithstanding existing state remedies for violations of state law.5 8 The plaintiff in
Monroe alleged a right to a remedy under Section 1983 when the
Chicago police infringed his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Illinois Constitution, Illinois statutes, and Chicago city ordinances all prohibited
such searches and seizures, and state law provided a remedy for
violations. 9 Under the Legalist Model, no Section 1983 claim
could have been brought. But the Monroe Court adopted the Governmental Model used in Classic and Screws, and permitted the
plaintiff to bring a Section 1983 claim. For the next twenty years,
the courts used the Governmental Model.
C.

The Resurrection of the Legalist Model
1. Parrattv. Taylor

In 1981 the Supreme Court suddenly returned to the Legalist
Model.6° In Parratt v. Taylor,6 ' the Court rejected a prisoner's
claim that his federal due process rights had been violated when
56. Screws, 325 U.S. at 108 n.10 (noting that "petitioners may be guilty of manslaughter or murder under Georgia law").
57. Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in Screws also adopted the Governmental
Model. "The [Fourteenth] Amendment and the legislation were not aimed at rightful state
action. Abuse of state power was the target. Limits were put to state authority, and states
were forbidden to pass them, by whatever agency." Id. at 115 (Rutledge, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted); see also Larry Alexander, ConstitutionalTorts, the Supreme Court,and
the Law of Noncontradiction:An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 576,581
(1993) (describing application of Governmental Model in Screws).
58. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
59. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172 n.6.
60. Cf. Larry Alexander, Constitutional Torts, the Supreme Court, and the Law of
Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 576, 581 (1993)
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state prison officials negligently lost the prisoner's personal property.62 The Court emphasized that an adequate remedy existed
under state law for the deprivation of this property. While thenJustice Rehnquist's opinion claimed that the decision was consistent with Monroe,63 in fact, the Court resurrected the Legalist
Model. 64 First noting that prior decisions had found procedural
due process satisfied without a predeprivation hearing under certain circumstances,65 Justice Rehnquist created a new circumstance
in which a predeprivation hearing is not required:
The justifications which we have found sufficient to uphold takings
of property without any predeprivation process are applicable to a
situation such as the present one involving a tortious loss of a prisoner's property as a result of a random and unauthorized act by a

state employee. In such a case, the loss is not the result of some established state procedure and the State cannot predict precisely
when the loss will occur. It is difficult to conceive of how the State
could provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes
place.66
(noting that in Parratt,"without warning, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from the
Governmental model").
61. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
62. The Court's sudden return to the Legalist Model is evidenced by the fact that the
district court in Parrattoriginally granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at
529-30. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's application of the Governmental Model in a per curiam order. Id.
63. Id. at 534-36. In City of Columbus v. Leonard, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote in
dissent that it might be time for the "reconsideration of [the] Court's conclusion in Monroe
that the 'federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy."' City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905, 910-11 (1979).
64. See Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt Doctrine After
Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Process or Turning the Fourteenth Amendment into a
"Font of Tort Law", 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 445, 461-62 n.10 (1991) (noting that "Parrattis
. .. fundamentally at odds with the holding in Monroe that action 'under color of law'
includes action not authorized by the law").
65. See Parratt,451 U.S. at 539 (stating that prior cases recognize that either necessity
of quick action by state or impracticality of providing any meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled with availability of some meaningful means by which to assess propriety of state's action at some time after initial taking, can satisfy requirements of due
process).
66. Id. at 541 (emphasis added). Parratt'sLegalist Model provides some protection to
the victim from a state employee's "random and unauthorized conduct" by requiring that
the state provide a "meaningful postdeprivation hearing." Id. The Court in the Civil
Rights Cases was willing to presume that an adequate state remedy was available. See the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (noting that victim's rights "may presumably be
vindicated by resort to the laws of the state for redress"). For examples of cases following
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If later cases had emphasized the impossibility of predicting the
loss in Parratt,we could have avoided the Wonderland in which we
find ourselves.67 Instead, as described below in Parts II and IV,
later cases emphasized the "random and unauthorized" act of the
state employees in Parratt. The emphasis on random and unauthorized acts transformed the predictability standard into the identical twin of the random and unauthorized standard. As
interpreted in these later cases, the phrase "random and unauthorized act" reinstated the Legalist Model first used in Barney v. City
of New York: "The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by
any [state] authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that
individual ....6
2. Hudson v. Palmer
7°
Hudson v. Palmer6 9 applied the Legalist Model used in Parratt.
In Hudson a prisoner alleged a prison officer intentionally destroyed his personal property during a shakedown search. Unlike
the negligent deprivation of property alleged in Parratt,in Hudson
the alleged deprivation was intentional. The Supreme Court nonetheless held that the Parrattrule precluded a claim under Section
1983. Chief Justice Burger used Legalist reasoning in his opinion:
The underlying rationale of Parrattis that when deprivations of property are effected through random and unauthorized conduct of a
state employee, predeprivation procedures are simply "impracticable" since the state cannot know when such deprivations will occur.... The state can no more anticipate and control in advance the
random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees than
it can anticipate similar negligent conduct. Arguably, intentional
acts are even more difficult to anticipate because one bent on inten-

Parratt'sLegalist Model, but permitting the plaintiff to bring a § 1983 claim because of the
lack of an adequate post-deprivation remedy under state law, see discussion infra part III.
67. Such an emphasis would have been consistent with the prior cases noted in Parratt
by Justice Rehnquist. Parratt,451 U.S. at 539. If a deprivation cannot be predicted, then
obviously it is impractical to provide any meaningful predeprivation process. Id. at 539.
68. Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 439 (1904) (quoting Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. at 17).
69. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
70. Id. at 534-36; Larry Alexander, Constitutional Torts, the Supreme Court, and the
Law of Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 576, 582
n.26 (1993) (describing Hudson as "resounding endorsement of the Legalist model").
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tionally depriving a person of his property might well take affirmative steps to avoid signalling his intent.71
In Parratt,the accidental loss of property could not be foreseen.
Hudson suddenly expanded the concept of p redictability by focusing on the ability of the state to anticipate specific "random and
unauthorized" intentional conduct of a particularemployee of the
state.72 Hudson thus used the reasoning rejected in Home Telephone: the prison guard used the power given to him by the state
to intentionally deprive Mr. Palmer of his property, and then the
guard was permitted 73 "for the purpose of avoiding the application
of the Amendment, [to] deny the power, and thus accomplish the
74
wrong.

II.

'

ZINERMON

v.

BURcH: ONE OPINION,

Two

MODELS

After Hudson, it appeared that the Legalist Model had triumphed, at least for procedural due process claims under Section
1983. While the use of the Legalist Model, as demonstrated later in
Part V.B, is questionable given the purposes of Section 1983, Parratt and Hudson at least had the virtue of consistency. The rules
might not have been the correct rules, but we knew what the rules
were. The lower courts no longer have such certain guidelines after the decision in Zinermon v. Burch,75 in which the Supreme
Court gave contradictory directions. After Zinermon, we find ourselves in the middle of the Section 1983 Wonderland, seeking directions from a judicial Cheshire Cat who seems to say, "Visit either
Model you like: they're both mad."
The Supreme Court in Zinermon v. Burch used both the Legalist
and Governmental models to find that Mr. Burch could challenge
his admission to a Florida mental health facility as a deprivation of
71. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.
72. In contrast, Justice Blackmun in his concurrence in Parrattused "random and unauthorized" to mean "not intentional," explaining that "[wihile the 'random and unauthorized' nature of negligent acts by state employees makes it difficult for the State to 'provide
a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place,'... it is rare that the same can be
said of intentional acts by state employees." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 546 (1981),
overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
73. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 544.
74. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 288 (1913).
75. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
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his liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Florida Legislature had enacted statutes that
permitted the "voluntary" admission of a mental health patient
only if the patient gave "express and informed consent. '76 Express
and informed conseni was defined by the Florida Legislature as
''consent voluntarily given in writing after sufficient explanation
and disclosure.., to enable the person ...to make a knowing and
willful decision without any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress,
or other form of constraint or coercion. '17 Under the Legalist
Model, these statutes would require a judgment for the defendants,
because Florida's lawmakers had enacted laws that forbid the involuntary admission of an individual to a mental health facility
without due process 78 and had provided state law remedies. 79 Not
surprisingly, this is exactly what the defendants in Zinermon
argued.80
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the majority began with the Governmental Model, noting that Monroe v. Pape81 rejected "the view
that Section 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights
that are authorized by state law, and does not reach abuses of state
authority that are forbidden by the State's statutes or Constitution
or are torts under the [s]tate's common law."'8 2 In other words,
Monroe rejected the Legalist Model.
If Justice Blackmun had stopped here, we would at least know
that the Governmental Model has (for the moment) triumphed

76. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 123 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.465(1)(a)).
77. See id., 494 U.S. at 123 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.455(22)).
78. See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A
Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
169, 178 (1991) (stating that, as of 1990, Florida was one of only twelve states statutorily
requiring patient to be competent in order to be voluntarily admitted to mental health
facility).
79. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 130 n.15 (describing availability of statutory rights to
damages, writ of habeas corpus, and common law tort of false imprisonment).
80. Id. at 130; see Larry Alexander, Constitutional Torts, the Supreme Court,and the
Law of Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 576, 585
(1993) (noting that Zinermon defendants invoked Legalist model). The defendants' argument was accepted by the district court and by an Eleventh Circuit panel. Zinermon, 494
U.S. at 115-16.
81. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in parton other grounds by Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
82. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 124.
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over the Legalist Model.83 Unfortunately, the opinion avoided
clarity and certainty by then using the Legalist Model. While noting that due process ordinarily "requires some kind of a hearing
before the State deprives a person of liberty or property," 84 the
opinion recognized that in some circumstances a postdeprivation
remedy satisfies due process.85 The Zinermon majority described
Parrattand Hudson as cases in which a predeprivation hearing was
not required because:
In Hudson, as in Parratt,the state official was not acting pursuant to
any established state procedure, but, instead, was apparently pursuing a random, unauthorized personal vendetta against the prisoner .... [Tlhe fact that the guard's conduct was intentional meant
that he himself could "foresee" the wrongful deprivation and could
prevent it simply by refraining from his misconduct. Nonetheless,
the Court found that an individual state employee's ability to foresee
the deprivation is "of no consequence," because the proper inquiry
under Parrattis "whether
the state is in a position to provide for
' 86
predeprivation process.
Under Parratt/Hudson'sLegalist Model, the State of Florida could
not foresee that Florida State Hospital employees would "voluntarily" admit Mr. Burch even though he did not satisfy the statutory
standard for express and informed consent. 87 Florida had also provided adequate postdeprivation remedies. 88 Mr. Burch's complaint
would therefore have been dismissed under the Legalist Model.89
The Court nonetheless framed the case as one that could be
properly heard under the Legalist Model by noting that the Florida
statutes "do not direct any member of the facility staff to determine whether a person is competent to give consent, nor to initiate
83. The Governmental and Legalist Models have each dominated at particular times
in the Court's Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 jurisprudence. See discussion supra part
I.
84. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127.
85. Id. at 127-28.
86. Id. at 130 (citations omitted).
87. At Mr. Burch's initial admission to the Appalachee Community Mental Health
Services, the staff described him as "[hiallucinating, confused, and psychotic, and [he] believed he was 'in heaven."' Id. at 118.
88. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 130 n.15.
89. Florida'sinability to foresee the state employees' actions in admitting Mr. Burch
and the presence of adequate postdeprivation remedies formed the basis for Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Zinermon. Id. at 141-42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the involuntary placement procedure for every incompetent patient."9 Had Mr. Burch challenged the adequacy of the statutes
enacted by the Florida Legislature, the Legalist Model would have
permitted his suit. 91 However, Mr. Burch had expressly disavowed
any challenge to the adequacy of the Florida statutory scheme.92
Indeed, Mr. Burch conceded that "if Florida's statutes were strictly
complied with, no deprivation of liberty without due process would
93
occur."

Up to this point in the opinion, the Court had used the Governmental and Legalist Models in separate parts of the opinion. In
one critical paragraph, however, the Court freely mixed the Legalist and Governmental Models:
It may be permissible constitutionally for a State to have a statutory scheme like Florida's, which gives state officials broad power
and little guidance in admitting mental patients. But when those officials fail to provide constitutionally required procedural safeguards
to a person whom they deprive of liberty, the state officials cannot
then escape liability by invoking Parrattand Hudson. It is immaterial whether the due process violation Burch alleges is best described
as arising from petitioners' failure to comply with state procedures
for admitting involuntary patients, or from the absence of a specific
requirement that petitioners determine whether a patient is competent to consent to voluntary admission. Burch's suit is neither an
action challenging the facial adequacy of a State's statutory procedures, nor an action based only on state officials' random and unauthorized violation of state laws. Burch is not simply attempting to
blame the State for misconduct by its employees. He seeks to hold
state officials accountable for their abuse of their broadly delegated,
uncircumscribed power to effect the deprivation at issue. 94

90. Id. at 135.
91. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436-37 (1982) (permitting challenge to "established state procedure" without consideration of adequate postdeprivation
state remedies).
92. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 115 (describing Burch's complaint as based on failure of
Florida's officials to follow state's procedures); id. at 117 (noting that Burch disavowed any
challenge to statutes themselves and restricted his claim to contention that failure of state
hospital's doctors, administrators, and employees to provide constitutionally adequate
safeguards violated his due process rights).
93. Id. at 117 n.3.
94. Id. at 135-136.
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Each sentence in this paragraph shifts from one model to the
other. The six sentences in the paragraph can be classified as: (1)
Legalist; (2) Governmental; (3) Governmental/Legalist; (4) Governmental; (5) Legalist; and (6) Governmental/Legalist. The first
sentence 95 used the Legalist Model when describing Florida's
lawmakers as having given Florida mental health officials "little
guidance." The second sentence 96 used the Governmental Model
because it emphasized the failure of the state employees to act
notwithstanding the state's statutory requirements. The third sentence 97 began with the Governmental Model when it described the
violation as one arising from the state employees' "failure to comply with state procedures," but then returned to the Legalist Model
when it described the "absence of a specific requirement that petitioners determine whether a patient is competent." The fourth
sentence 98 followed the Governmental Model in asserting that the
claim is not prohibited by Parratt/Hudson. The fifth sentence99
however, returned to the Legalist Model when it sought to distinguish Mr. Burch's claim as one that does "not simply attempt[ ] to
blame the State for misconduct by its employees." Blaming the
state for the misconduct of state employees is, of course, precisely
what Monroe v. Pape'00 and its Governmental Model permit.' 0 '
95. "It may be permissible constitutionally for a State to have a statutory scheme like
Florida's, which gives state officials broad power and little guidance in admitting mental
patients." Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
96. "But when those officials fail to provide constitutionally required procedural safeguards to a person whom they deprive of liberty, the state officials cannot then escape
liability by invoking Parrattand Hudson." Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 135.
97. "It is immaterial whether the due process violation Burch alleges is best described
as arising from petitioner's failure to comply with state procedures for admitting involuntary patients, or from the absence of a specific requirement that petitioners determine
whether a patient is competent to consent to voluntary admission." Id. at 135-136 (emphasis added).
98. "Burch's suit is neither an action challenging the facial adequacy of a State's statutory procedures, nor an action based only on state officials' random and unauthorized violation of state laws." Id. at 136.
99. "Burch is not simply attempting to blame the State for misconduct by its employees." Id. at 136.
100. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on othergrounds by Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
101. "Blaming the state" for § 1983 purposes does not mean that the state will be
liable. The state is not liable under § 1983 in suits filed in federal court because it is immune under the Eleventh Amendment. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979). Nor is
the state liable under § 1983 in suits filed in state court. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Municipalities and other local governments are liable under §
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The final sentence, 02 like the third sentence, began with the Governmental Model by acknowledging the employees' "abuse" of
power. This last sentence, however, returned to the Legalist Model
by describing Mr. Burch's claim as a challenge to the Florida Legislature's "broadly delegated, uncircumscribed power .. .
After this thorough m~lange of the Governmental and Legalist
Models, the Court purported to explain why Mr. Burch's claim was
not controlled by Parratt and Hudson, two Legalist cases. Three
factors, according to Justice Blackmun, explained why Mr. Burch
was able to bring his Section 1983 claim: (1) the deprivation was
not "unpredictable"; 10 3 (2) predeprivation process was not "impossible";'" and (3) the defendants' conduct was not "unauthorized"
because Florida had delegated to them "broad" authority to effect
the deprivation and the concomitant duty to initiate the procedural
safeguards set up by state law.'0 5 These factors are discussed in
Part VI of this Article.
The Zinermon Court reached the result that would be reached
under the Governmental Model.0 6 This result would not be
reached under the Legalist Model. The Court began by using the
Governmental Model, yet also used Parrattand Hudson, cases decided under the Legalist Model. The Court concluded by freely
mixing the Governmental and Legalist Models, although these two
models are contradictory in their approaches. 0 7 If we are confused
1983 only if the employee's "misconduct" can be characterized as a "policy or custom" of
the governmental entity. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95. What really is at stake in many §
1983 cases is whether a plaintiff can hold a state employee liable for misconduct the employee could engage in only because of her status as a state employee. See Home Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287-89 (1913) (emphasizing Fourteenth
Amendment's "state action" requirement is met when officer or representative of state
proceeds upon assumption of possession of state power even though action is in fact illegal
under state law). See also discussion infra part IV.B.1 (discussing the inappropriate application of Monell principles to determine general liability under § 1983).
102. "He seeks to hold state officials accountable for their abuse of their broadly delegated, uncircumscribed power to effect the deprivation at issue." Zinermon, 494 U.S. at
136.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 136-37.
105. Id. at 138.
106. See Larry Alexander, Constitutional Torts, the Supreme Court, and the Law of
Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 576, 586 (1993)
(asserting that Zinermon is "easy" case under Governmental Model).
107. The two models are contradictory in those cases in which three conditions are
met: (1) a state employee deprives an individual of a protected interest without a
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today, 10 8 it is because the Supreme Court itself seems to be confused about what it is doing in these Section 1983 cases. The Governmental Model is fundamentally inconsistent with the Legalist
Model, 10 9 yet the Court attempted to combine the two models in
Zinermon.
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Zinermon was at least consistent.
It applied only the Legalist Model" 0 and, consistent with that
model, found that Mr. Burch could not state a claim under Secpredeprivation hearing; (2) the state employee is not required under any state procedure
established by the state's lawmakers to effect the deprivation; and (3) the state's
lawmakers provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy.
108. See Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1409 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (describing ParrattlHudsonline of precedent as "resembling the
path of a drunken sailor"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991); Larry Alexander, Constitutional Torts, the Supreme Court,and the Law of Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon
v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 576, 596 (1993) (stating that "confusion is the predictable
consequence of [Zinermon's] simultaneous endorsement of irreconcilable positions");
Karen M. Blum, Monell, DeShaney, and Zinermon: Official Policy, Affirmative Duty, Established State Procedureand Local Government Liability Under Section 1983, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 41 (1990) (finding that "[iun the aftermath of Zinermon, predictable
confusion is already evident in decisions from the lower courts"); Daniel S. Feder, From
Parratt to Zinermon Authorization, Adequacy, and Immunity in a Systematic Analysis of
State Procedure,11 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 858 (1990) (criticizing reasoning of Zinermon
as quite confused); Michael A. Pavlick, Comment, Zinermon v. Burch: The Court Shoots
Down a Parratt, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1990) (introducing discussion of
Zinermon by quoting THE KINKS, State of Confusion, on STATE OF CONFUSION (Arista
Records, Inc. 1983): "1 don't know whether I'm coming or going. Can't cover up because
it's obviously showing. It's a state, state of confusion.... We're in a state, state of confusion"); Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt DoctrineAfter Zinermon v.
Burch: Ensuring Due Processor Turning the FourteenthAmendment into a "Font of Tort
Law", 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 445, 474 (1991) (stating that confusion arose shortly after
decision in Zinermon); cf. Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal
Rights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 13 (1991)
(describing split among courts of appeals after Parratt). But see Daniel S. Feder, From
Parratt to Zinermon: Authorization, Adequacy, and Immunity in a Systematic Analysis of
State Procedure,11 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 860 (1990) (contending that "the apparent inconsistency between Zinermon and Parrattis largely illusory"); Edward R. Stabell, III,
Note, Zinermon v. Burch: Putting Brackets Around the Parratt Doctrine, 42 MERCER L.
REV. 1655, 1655 (1991) (asserting that Zinermon "provides a consistent approach to determining" acts attributable to government).
109. Cf Ricci v. Paolino, No. 91-1994, 1992 WL 63521, **4 (1st Cir. Apr. 11, 1992)
(stating that Zinermon "employed language at some variance with that of Parratt"). Judge
Easterbrook attributes the inconsistencies in Zinermon to the ambivalent approaches of
Justices White and Stevens in this field. Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1409 (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
110. Larry Alexander, ConstitutionalTorts, the Supreme Court, and the Law of Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 576, 592 (1993)
(describing Justice O'Connor's dissent as adopting pure Legalist model).

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

tion 1983 because Florida state law prohibited the violations of Mr.
Burch's rights and provided remedies for such violations. But this
consistency was possible only because the dissent ignored Monroe
v. Pape and other cases following the Governmental Model."'
Never even mentioning Monroe,"' the dissent thus "reduce[d] the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of fundamental fairness to a
' 3
question of mere facial regularity." 1
111. See Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, FederalRights, and
State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 34 (1991) (noting that
"Justice O'Connor's position in Zinermon ...is indistinguishable from the Frankfurter
arguments that were rejected in Monroe"). As an Arizona state appellate court judge,
Justice O'Connor "advocated the exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite to bringing
a § 1983 action." Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt Doctrine After
Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Process or Turning the Fourteenth Amendment into a
"Font of Tort Law", 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 445, 478 n.233 (1991) (citing Sandra D.
O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federaland State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981)). This position was
rejected in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (holding that state administrative remedies need not be exhausted prior to bringing suit under § 1983).
112. Justice O'Connor's avoidance of Monroe would be appropriate if Monroe is not
affected by Parratt/Hudsonbecause Monroe is an interpretation of § 1983, while Parratti
Hudson is substantive constitutional law based upon an interpretation of the Due Process
Clause itself. MARTIN H. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:
CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES § 3.12, at 193 (2d ed. 1991), quoted in Hartwick v. Board of

Trustees of Johnson County Community College, 782 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 n.5 (D. Kan.
1992). This purported distinction simply begs the question: Why should § 1983 due process claims be treated differently from the § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims brought in
Monroe? After all, state law remedies were available in Monroe just as they were in ParrattlHudson. See discussion of Monroe in Part I.B.3 above. Cf Rodney M. Confer, Constitutional Law in the Eighth Circuit: Postdeprivation Remedy Defeats a Substantive Due
ProcessClaim, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 697, 702 (1993) (noting that Parrattdistinguished its
facts as claim based on "the Fourteenth Amendment simpliciter" rather than "more specific and well-defined rights" of other constitutional provisions).
Similar arguments were rejected in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). The
defendants in that case argued that United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), which had
earlier used the Governmental model to find a violation of Section 20 of the Federal Criminal Code, could be distinguished because the rights violated were "specifically guaranteed
by Art. I, § 2 and § 4 of the Constitution," Screws, 325 U.S. at 95, rather than by the vague
guarantees of the Due Process Clause. The majority rejected this argument, finding that
the specific intent required by the criminal civil rights statute "is an intent to deprive a
person of a right which has been made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them." Id. at 104. As the
Court noted later, the argument "would mean that all protection for violations of due
process of law would drop out of the Act." Id. at 105.
113. Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, FederalRights, and State
Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 25 (1991); see Paul F.
Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt DoctrineAfter Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Processor Turning the FourteenthAmendment into a "Font of Tort Law", 39 CLEV.
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THE RESPONSE TO ZNERMON IN THE LOWER COURTS:
CONFUSION

Notwithstanding its contradictory use of the Governmental and
Legalist Models, Zinermon clearly intended to restrict the application of the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine:
Parrattand Hudson represent a special case of the general Mathews
v. Eldridge analysis.... Parrattis not an exception to the Mathews
balancing test, but rather an application of that test to the unusual
case in which one of the variables in the Mathews equation-the
value of predeprivation safeguards-is
negligible in preventing the
114
kind of deprivation at issue.
If Parratt is a "special case" and an "unusual case," the lower
courts after Zinermon should generally apply the Governmental
Model. This application would permit Section 1983 plaintiffs with
procedural due process claims to proceed, even if the challenged
action is illegal under state law and even if there are adequate
postdeprivation state remedies available.11 5 The lower courts
should rarely apply the Legalist Model, which would ordinarily require dismissal of Section 1983 claims." 6
Commentators have predicted confusion in the lower courts after Zinermon,"7 suggesting that Parratt may not be a special or
ST. L. REV. 478, 479 (1991) (noting that if only illegal laws are prohibited by § 1983, "it
would be rather simple for any state policymaker to avoid § 1983 liability by keeping the
laws clean, while at the same time covertly promoting any deprivation that he or she saw
fit").
114. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128-29 (1990) (emphasis added).
115. The application of the Governmental Model does not mean that a § 1983 procedural due process claim will never be dismissed. See, e.g., Buclary v. Borough of Northampton, No. CIV.A.90-7950, 1991 WL 133851, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1991) (finding no
predeprivation process required for applicants denied employment as police officers where
impractical to provide it); Edmondson v. City of Boston, No. CIV.A.89-0395-Z, 1990 WL
235426, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 1990) (using Governmental Model to find postdeprivation
remedy sufficient when ward was left alone in police car, crashed car, and went into coma).
116. Application of the Legalist Model does not always mean that the § 1983 plaintiff
cannot prevail. See, e.g., Knight v. Sanders, No. 89-15654, 1991 WL 138817, at *1 (9th Cir.
1991) (vacating dismissal of claim because state remedy may be inadequate); Sturdevant v.
Haferman, 798 F. Supp. 536, 540-41 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (permitting § 1983 claim because no
adequate state remedy exists); United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 768 F. Supp.
613, 617 (W.D. Mich. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 960 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1992) (granting
injunctive relief under § 1983 because no adequate state remedy was available).
117. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, ConstitutionalTorts, the Supreme Court,and the Law
of Noncontradiction: An Essay on Zinermon v. Burch, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 576, 596 (1993)
(predicting confusion in wake of Zinermon); Karen M. Blum, Monell, DeShaney, and
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unusual case. This assertion, like many such scholarly insights, has
little empirical support and may not accurately describe the experience of the lower courts in applying Zinermon.118 However, an examination of the cases available in Westlaw 19 on July 1, 1993,
revealed that, although Zinermon intended to narrow the application of the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine, 2 ° most lower courts have continued to use the Legalist Model.' 2 ' Lower courts have routinely
applied the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine instead of reserving it for the
special and unusual case.
Zinermon: Official Policy, Affirmative Duty, Established State Procedureand Local Government Liability Under Section 1983, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 41 (1990) (finding evidence of confusion in lower courts' application of Zinermon); Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note,
Section 1983 and the Parratt DoctrineAfter Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Process or
Turning the Fourteenth Amendment into a "Font of Tort Law", 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 445,
474 (1991) (noting confusion following Zinermon decision).
118. See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri L. Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1153 (1991) (noting that largely
untried technique of reading all cases in specific areas of law provides insights beyond
grasp of traditional legal analysis, which relies on small samples of cases and therefore may
reach conclusions that are "unsupported by the mass of legal decisions").
119. The cases available in Westlaw or other databases are not complete. Cases that
are settled, for example, will rarely be included. Nonetheless, the published cases are those
which shape perceptions of the legal system. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri L. Johnson, The
Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151,
1195 (1991).
120. See Plumer v. Maryland, 915 F.2d 927, 929 (4th Cir. 1990) (asserting that in
Zinermon, "the Supreme Court recently reemphasized Parratt'snarrow scope"); Easter
House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1400 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (stating that "Zinermon
narrowed the scope of Parratt'sapplication"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991); Laura
Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, FederalRights, and State Remedies Thirty
Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 8 (1991) (noting that Zinermon establishes
Parrattas narrow rule); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 169, 177 (1991) (finding that Zinermon restricts Parrattdefense to narrow class of
procedural due process actions); Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt
Doctrine After Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Process or Turning the Fourteenth
Amendment into a "Font of Tort Law", 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 445, 468 (1991) (describing

Zinermon as seeking to distinguish and limit reach of Parrattdecision); cf Caine v. Hardy,
943 F.2d 1406, 1413 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (finding that Zinermon requires hard look at
Parratt/Hudsondefense), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992).
121. My findings contradict Professor Oren's conclusions, reached shortly after
Zinermon was decided, that "[m]ost other lower court opinions acknowledge that after
Zinermon there is only a narrow scope for the Parrattdefense to procedural due process
claims," Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and State
Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 55 (1991), and that most
courts of appeals' opinions "have understood the restrictive message of Zinermon." Id. at
68.
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Confusion in the Lower Courts

A July 1, 1993, Westlaw search produced 223 cases citing
Zinermon, 213 of which were United States courts of appeals and
United States district court cases. 122 Of these 213 cases, 129 discussed the potential application of the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine. In
the tables that follow, cases in which the issue of the application of
the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine was used to decide the case are classified as following either the Governmental Model or the Legalist
Model. Cases in which the application of the doctrine was not used
to decide the case, but in which the court discussed the issue, are
classified as "Dicta" under either the Governmental Model or the
Legalist Model.
1. Decisions of Courts of Appeals
Table I summarizes the published decisions of the United States
courts of appeals as detailed in Appendix 1,123 while Table II sum-

122. The author searched Westlaw for "Zinermon w/5 Burch" in the ALLFEDS
database on July 1, 1993. This search request will not locate cases which do not cite
Zinermon. See, e.g., United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 960 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1992)
(applying Parrattin dicta without citing or discussing Zinermon), rev'g on other grounds,
768 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (discussing Zinermon but applying Legalist Model);
Smith v. Massachusetts Dep't of Corrections, 936 F.2d 1390, 1402 (1st Cir. 1991) (asserting
that § 1983 procedural due process claim can be brought only if no adequate state
postdeprivation remedy exists, but not citing or discussing Zinermon); G.M. Eng'rs & Assocs. v. West Bloomfield Township, 922 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1990) (failing to cite or
discuss Zinermon, but applying Parrattto procedural due process claim that counsel conceded at oral argument was not presented by case); Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463,
467-68 (11th Cir. 1990) (following Governmental Model impliedly, but not citing Zinermon
in holding that postdeprivation remedies are insufficient if predeprivation remedies are
practicable in suit not challenging facial validity of relevant state statute), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2053 (1991).
123. Fields v. Durham, 909 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 786 (1991),
is classified in Appendix I as using the governmental Model. Cf. Laura Oren, Signing Into
Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, FederalRights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe
v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 66 (1991) (noting that Fields court improperly returned to emphasizing existence of adequate state law remedies. Appendix I does not include Swank v.
Smart, 898 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990). while the majority
in Swank found that a police officer's pretermination hearing was inadequate, it did not
discuss the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine. The Swank dissent used the Legalist Model and concluded the case should be dismissed because the hearing violated the police department's
manual. Swank, 898 F.2d at 1262 (Manion, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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marizes the unpublished decisions 124 of these courts as detailed in
Appendix II.
TABLE I - PUBLISHED DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS

Circuit

Governmental
Model

Legalist
Model

Dicta Governmental
Model

Dicta Legalist
Model

D.C.
1
2

4
1

1

1

3
4

2

5

1

2

6

1

1

2

7

6

2

8

1

9

1

10

1
1

11
Total

5

17

3

5

124. Westlaw provides access to many "unpublished" opinions. While the local rules
of many courts prohibit citation to these unpublished opinions, see 5th Cir. R. 47.5.3 (permitting citation of unpublished opinions only in limited circumstances), the unpublished
opinion "may have a lingering effect in the circuit." Smith v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 667,
669 n.* (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), quoted in David M.
Gunn, "Unpublished Opinions Shall Not Be Cited As Authority": The Emerging Contours
of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure90(i), 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 115, 124 n.42 (1992). To
determine whether unpublished opinions may apply Zinermon differently, the author has
analyzed them separately. As shown in the tables that follow, both published and unpublished opinions of the courts of appeals and the district courts favored the use of the Legalist Model.
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TABLE

II

- UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS

Circuit

Governmental
Model

Legalist
Model

Dicta Governmental
Model

Dicta Legalist
Model

0

0

D.C.

1

3

2
3
4

2

5
6

1

7

6
4

8
9

4

10
11
Total

3

17

Contrary to Zinermon's description of Parrattas the "unusual"
case, the courts of appeals in both published and unpublished
decisions clearly favored the Legalist Model. Appellate courts
used the Legalist Model in thirty-four appellate decisions, while
applying the Governmental Model in only eight. Appellate
decisions discussing the issue in dicta also favored the Legalist
Model, although by a narrower margin of five to three.
2. Decisions of District Courts
Table III summarizes the published decisions of the United
States district courts (grouped by circuit) as detailed in Appendix
III. Table IV summarizes the unpublished decisions of these courts
as detailed in Appendix IV.
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III - PUBLISHED DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS

Circuit

Governmental
Model

Legalist
Model

Dicta Governmental
Model

Dicta Legalist
Model

D.C.

1

2

2

3

3

1

4

5

1

5

1

1

6

1

5

1

7

4

8

3

1
6

2
2

8
9

1

10

1

11

1

Total

18

23

1

8

Like the courts of appeals, the district courts have favored the
Legalist Model over the Governmental Model in both published
and unpublished decisions, although not so enthusiastically as the
courts of appeals. The Legalist Model was used in thirty-nine
district court decisions, while the Governmental Model was used in
twenty-nine. Published district court decisions discussing the issue
in dicta favored the Legalist Model by a margin of eight to one.
One unpublished decision discussed the Governmental Model in
dictum.
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TABLE

IV

3

- UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS

Circuit

Governmental
Model

Legalist
Model

Dicta Governmental
Model

Dicta Legalist
Model

1

0

D.C.

2

1

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Total
3.

2
1

2

7

9

11

2
1
1
16

Summary of the Lower Courts' Decisions After Zinermon

Table V summarizes the information provided in Tables I - IV.
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TABLE V - SUMMARY TABLE OF POST-ZNERMON DECISIONS

Circuit

Governmental
Model

Legalist
Model

Dicta Governmental
Model

Dicta Legalist
Model

Published
Court of
Appeals
Decisions

5

17

3

5

Unpublished
Court of
Appeals
Decisions

3

17

0

0

18

23

1

8

11

16

1

0

37

73

5

13

Published
District
Court
Decisions
Unpublished
District
Court
Decisions
TOTAL

Because trial courts and courts of appeals have used the Legalist
Model twice as often as the Governmental Model in the postZinermon era, the application of Parratt can hardly be called
"unusual." The lower courts are stuck in the middle of the Section
1983 Wonderland.
B.

Confusion Within Each Circuit

The confusion of the lower courts is also evidenced by a comparison of the decisions of the courts of appeals for each circuit with
the decisions of the district courts in that circuit. The eleven circuits 25 fall into seven groups:
125. Neither the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit nor the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit based any of their
decisions during this period on the applicability of the ParrattlHudsondoctrine. The District of Columbia Circuit discussed the issue once in dictum. See infra Appendix I. This
paucity of case law is not unexpected as the Federal Circuit has specialized jurisdiction, and
the D.C. Circuit covers only the District of Columbia.
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Group #

Model Followed
by Court of
Appeals

Model Followed
by District Courts
in the Circuit

Circuits in Group

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Legalist
Legalist
Legalist
Split
Governmental
N/A
Legalist

Legalist
Governmental
Split
Split
Split
Split
N/A

9th, 10th
1st
5th, 7th
2nd, 6th
4th
3rd, 11th
8th

The decisions of the courts in Group number 1, comprising the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits, have been consistent. 126 Both the courts
of appeals and the district courts have consistently followed the
Legalist Model.
The court of appeals in Group number 2, consisting solely of the
First Circuit, uniformly has used the Legalist Model. However, the
district courts in the First Circuit have consistently used the
Governmental Model.
The courts of appeals in Group number 3, comprising the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits, have applied the Legalist Model. 27 The
district courts in these circuits, however, have split, with at least
one district court in each circuit using the Governmental Model.
The one district court in the Fifth Circuit using the Governmental
Model, 128 however, reached its decision before the Fifth Circuit's
en banc decision in Caine v. Hardy.2 9 If the district courts in the
Fifth Circuit apply the Legalist Model after the en banc decision in
Caine, the Fifth Circuit may move to Group number 1.
126. One Ninth Circuit decision followed the Governmental Model in dictum. See
Sierra Lake Reserve v. City of Rocklin, 938 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1991) (declining to
decide Parrattissue because plaintiff's claims could be stated equally well as substantive
due process claims, to which Parrattwould not apply), vacated on other grounds, 113 S. Ct.
31 (1992), retained in pertinent part on remand, 987 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1993).
127. For the Fifth Circuit, this consistency has existed only since the en banc decision
in Caine v. Hardy, 943 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474
(1992).
128. Price v. Carpenter, 758 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 951 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.
1991) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2942 (1992).
129. 943 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992). This
case is discussed in Part IV.A.
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In Group number 4, comprising the Second and Sixth Circuits,
the courts of appeals have split their decisions between the Legalist
and Governmental Models. The district courts, perhaps following
the lead of their appellate courts, have split their decisions. 3 °
Group number 5 is the converse of Group number 3. Group
number 5 consists solely of the Fourth Circuit. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has consistently followed
the Governmental Model. The district courts, however,
have split
131
between the Governmental and Legalist Models.
Group number 6 appeals courts, comprising the Third and
Eleventh Circuits, have issued no decisions citing Zinermon, as
shown by Appendix 111.132 Perhaps reflecting the lack of circuit
precedent, the district courts in Group number 6 have split
between the Governmental and Legalist Models. The Eleventh
Circuit will soon move into another
group when it issues its en
133
banc opinion in McKinney v. Pate.

130. Only one district court in the Sixth Circuit has used the Governmental Model.
See Loukas v. Hofbauer, 784 F. Supp. 377, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
131. Only one district court in the Fourth Circuit has used the Legalist Model. See
Biser v. Town of Bel Air, 778 F. Supp. 249, 253 (D. Md.), afjd on other grounds, 991 F.2d
100 (4th Cir. 1991).
132. However, relevant cases may not have cited Zinermon. See, e.g., United of
Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 960 F.2d 31, 34-39 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying Parrattin
dicta but failing to cite to or discuss Zinermon), rev'g on other grounds, 768 F. Supp. 613,
617 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (discussing Zinermon but applying Legalist Model); Smith v.
Massachusetts Dep't of Corrections, 936 F.2d 1390, 1402 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that § 1983
claims may be brought if no adequate state postdeprivation remedy exists, but failing to
consider or discuss Zinermon); G.M. Eng'rs & Assocs. v. West Bloomfield Township, 922
F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1990) (failing to discuss Zinermon, but applying Parratt to
procedural due process claim not presented by case). One decision of the Eleventh Circuit
followed the Legalist Model in dictum. See McKinney v. Pate, 985 F.2d 1502, 1514-15 (11th
Cir. 1993) (Tjoflat, C.J. & Cox, J., concurring) (relying on Parratt in concluding that,
because state provided adequate remedy, no § 1983 claim existed), vacated and reh'g
granted, 994 F.2d 772, 772 (11th Cir. 1993).
133. 985 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g granted,994 F.2d 772, 772 (11th
Cir. 1993). In the panel opinion, Judges Tjoflat and Cox concurred in Judge Fay's opinion,
which decided the plaintiff's claim as a substantive due process claim under prior Eleventh
Circuit precedent. Id. at 1503. Judge Tjoflat, however, asserted that the claim was really a
procedural due process claim, and that, therefore, Parrattshould apply and the plaintiff's
claim should be dismissed. See id. at 1514-15 (Tjoflat, C.J., concurring) (reasoning that
when adequate state law remedy exists, Parrattapplies and plaintiff has no federal claim).
The Eleventh Circuit has granted a rehearing en banc. McKinney v. Pate, 994 F.2d 772,
772 (11th Cir. 1993).
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In the last group, consisting solely of the Eighth Circuit, the
Court of Appeals has issued one opinion, which followed the
Legalist Model. The district courts in Group number 7 have yet to
issue any decisions applying Zinermon.
It is not unusual for the court of appeals in one circuit to
disagree with the court of appeals in another circuit over the
interpretation of a Supreme Court precedent. It is less common,
however, for the district courts to fail to heed the direction given
by the court of appeals for their circuit. It is unlikely these district
courts have deliberately flouted the commands of the appellate
courts; it appears, instead, that the district courts are lost in the
Section 1983 Wonderland.
IV.

THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE LEGALIST MODEL IN THE

POST-ZNERMON ERA

That the lower courts are now in the Section 1983 Wonderland is
hardly surprising given Zinermon v. Burch's 134 use of both the
Governmental and the Legalist Models. How is it that most lower
courts have ended up with the Legalist Model at the Mad Hatter's
house rather than with the Governmental Model at the March
Hare's abode? The most common routes were set out in the opinions of the two courts of appeals that have considered Zinermon en
banc. Both the Fifth Circuit in Caine v. Hardy135 and the Seventh
Circuit in Easter House v. Felder136 used the Legalist Model and
essentially ignored the Governmental Model. A smaller group of
courts has purported to use the Legalist Model, noting the availa-

bility of adequate state remedies, in cases that
should have been
37
dismissed under claim-preclusion principles.

134. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
135. 943 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992).
136. 910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991).
137. See Zas v. South Dakota Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 976 F.2d 459, 465
(8th Cir. 1992) (declaring that deprivation by state action of constitutionally guaranteed
interest in life, liberty, and property is not actionable under § 1983 as violation of federal
due process when state had provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy used by the
plaintiff); Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 758 (1st Cir. 1990) (upholding summary judgment dismissing § 1983 claim by plaintiff who had previously unsuccessfully alleged due
process deprivations before a state board).
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The Fifth Circuit.: Caine v. Hardy and Charbonnet v. Lee
1. The Majority Opinion in Caine v. Hardy

The Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Caine v. Hardy138 exemplifies the confusion generated by Zinermon. In Caine,an anesthesiologist at a Mississippi public hospital filed suit under Section
1983 after he lost his staff privileges. The hospital stripped Dr.
Caine of his staff privileges in conformity with the hospital's procedures, and Mississippi state law permitted Dr. Caine to seek review
of that decision in the Mississippi state courts. 139 Initially, a Fifth
Circuit panel reversed the district court's dismissal of Dr. Caine's
complaint, finding that Zinermon permitted Dr. Caine to bring a
Section 1983 claim. 14° Writing for the Fifth Circuit en banc, Judge
Edith Jones, who had dissented as a member of the panel, reversed
the panel. Judge Jones's opinion followed the model set forth in
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Zinermon. 4 ' Judge Jones's opinion
is a classic statement of the Legalist Model that simply ignored the
Monroe v. Pape142 line of cases articulating the Governmental
Model. Thus, in response to Dr. Caine's claim of bias, Judge Jones
Mississippi's lawmakers provided Dr.
dismissed the claim because
43
Caine with a remedy.
Proceeding to an analysis of the three Zinermon factors, 144 the
en banc Fifth Circuit again used the Legalist Model. Rejecting the
claim that the risk of deprivation of a doctor's clinical privileges is
foreseeable, the court responded that "any risk to Dr. Caine ...
would have sprung only from wanton and intentional violations of
controlling state regulations."'45 With respect to the second
138. 943 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1474 (1992).
139. Id. at 1407.
140. Id. at 1410.
141. See discussion supra part II (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissent in Zinermon).
142. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
143. See Caine, 943 F.2d at 1413 (finding that Dr. Caine's "assertion that he was the
victim of partisan decisionmaking is of no moment ....The state of Mississippi has provided Dr. Caine all the process that is due.").
144. Zinermon applied three tests in determining whether Parrattand Hudson controlled the outcome and thus mandated a finding that no predeprivation process was necessary: (1) whether the deprivation was "unpredictable"; (2) whether the predeprivation
process was "impossible"; and (3) whether defendant's conduct was "unauthorized."
Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 136-38. In Zinermon, the answer to all three tests was negative. Id.
145. Id. at 1413-14 (emphasis added).
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Zinermon factor, Judge Jones concluded that the State could not
have articulated more specific regulations because the hospital regulations declared when, how, and why doctors could be disciplined. 146 The Legalist Model was used again to find that the third
Zinermon factor was not satisfied. 47 The opinion concluded that
the deprivation of due process suffered by Mr. Burch in Zinermon
was specifically condoned by the regulations, whereas the depriva'4
tion suffered by Dr. Caine was "random and unauthorized.'
The problem with the Fifth Circuit's analysis of Dr. Caine's claim
is that Mr. Burch's claim in Zinermon could be described in these
same terms. By "voluntarily" admitting Mr. Burch without his express and informed consent, the defendants in Zinermon engaged
in "wanton and intentional violations of controlling state regulations.' 1 49 These controlling regulations stated "when, how, and for
what reasons" Mr. Burch could be deprived of his liberty without
his consent. 150 It could not be said that Florida's mental health officials were authorized to abuse the regulations nor to admit Mr.
Burch for improper purposes. 51
The Fifth Circuit could distinguish Zinermon based on these illusory differences only because it incorrectly described the deprivation suffered by Mr. Burch as one "specifically condoned" by
Florida's lawmakers. 52 The Florida statutes authorized the "voluntary" admission of a mental-health patient only if such admission
met specific standards. The defendants in Zinermon were authorized under Florida law to admit Mr. Burch voluntarily only if his
consent was "express and informed."' 53 Although a careful reading of Zinermon establishes the lack of authorization by Florida's
146. Id. at 1414.
147. Id. The court stated, "[Ilt cannot be said that the decisionmakers in this case
were 'authorized' either to misuse the regulations or to discipline Dr. Caine for improper
purposes." Id.
148. Caine, 943 F.2d at 1414.
149. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 79-82.
150. See id. at 122-23 (describing Florida statutes authorizing emergency admission
and involuntary admission to mental health facility).
151. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 117 n.3 (describing Mr. Burch's position that strict
compliance with Florida statutes would prevent constitutional violation).
152. See Caine, 943 F.2d at 1414 (relying on statutory scheme to authorize hospital's
actions).
153. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 123 (discussing statute authorizing voluntary
admission).
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lawmakers for the deprivation suffered by Mr. Burch, the mischaracterization of Florida law by the Fifth Circuit was assisted by
those portions of the Zinermon opinion, detailed in Part II of this
Article, that used the Legalist Model. 154 Thus the Caine Court
cited to Zinermon's description of the Florida statutes as giving the
Florida state employees "broad power and little guidance."' 55
Lower courts using the Legalist Model have also mischaracterized
Zinermon. 56
While Judge Jones began her analysis of Zinermon in Caine by
asserting that Zinermon "requires a hard look at a Parratt/Hudson
defense,' 1 57 she concluded her analysis with the remarkable assertion that Zinermon "seems at this stage to represent a sui generis
situation.' 1 58 This statement is remarkable for two reasons. First,
the Supreme Court in Zinermon described Parrattas the "unusual
case. 9159 Second, in Mathias v. Bingley, 160 a Fifth Circuit case decided the year before Caine v. Hardy, Judge Goldberg quoted this
specific language in Zinermon and concluded: "Parratt applies
only in those cases [in which the value of predeprivation safeguards
is negligible in preventing the deprivation].' 6' This language is
consistent with the Governmental Model, not the Legalist Model.
Judge Jones, in Caine v. Hardy, ignored the Governmental line of
cases, including Mathias. The avoidance of that model was clearly

154. See Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and
State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 55 (1991) (noting that
"[s]ome of the language in Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Zinermon encourages
those who remain attached to a broad interpretation of Parratt").
155. See Caine, 943 F.2d at 1414 (quoting Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 135).
156. See Lolling v. Patterson, 966 F.2d 230, 234 n.6 (7th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing
Zinermon incorrectly as case in which state law authorized deprivation); Katz v. Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that Zinermon does not affect application of Parrattwhere plaintiff's deprivation was in violation of state law). The confusion of
the district court in Duenas v. Nagle, 765 F. Supp. 1393, 1399 (W.D. Wis. 1991), is all too
evident when the court distinguishes Zinermon as a case in which "despite a constitutionally valid scheme, the state somehow authorized defendants' conduct." Id. (emphasis added); see Daniel S. Feder, Note, From Parratt to Zinermon: Authorization, Adequacy, and
Immunity in a Systematic Analysis of State Procedure,11 CARDOZO L. REv. 831, 858 (1990)
(asserting incorrectly that defendants in Zinermon did not violate state procedures).
157. See Caine, 943 F.2d at 1413 (examining whether state officials' conduct could
have been foreseen and addressed by procedural safeguards).
158. Id. at 1415.
159. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 129.
160. 906 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.), modified on othergrounds, 915 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1990).
161. Mathias, 906 F.2d at 1056.
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deliberate as Judge Jones was a member of the panel
in Mathias
162
Parratt.
of
applicability
limited
the
that delineated
Under the Legalist Model, the outcome in Caine v. Hardy is reasonable because individuals like Dr. Caine presumably will be able
to seek recourse in the state courts based on state law claims.
However, if the Fifth Circuit had used the Governmental Model, it
would have permitted Dr. Caine to pursue his claim against the
hospital under Section 1983.
2. The Dissent in Caine v. Hardy
Judge Williams, the author of the panel's opinion, dissented at
the en banc rehearing. His opinion emphasized the procedural
posture of the case, noting that in reviewing a dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellate
court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true. One of the reasons for the majority opinion's finding that no predeprivation hearing was required was that patient safety was involved. 63 The
dissent rejected this assertion because the plaintiff's complaint
al164
leged that the deprivation was caused by bias and revenge.
The dissent also applied the Governmental Model to find that
Zinermon, rather than Parratt/Hudson, controlled. The first
Zinermon factor, predictability, was satisfied because the deprivation occurred when the hospital began a termination proceeding.
In contrast to the Legalist use of predictability discussed in Part
IV.B.1 below, which mutates "predictability" into the "random and
unauthorized" factor, the Caine dissent found that the existence of
state procedural safeguards that were not followed made the deprivation "foreseeable because [the state] attempted to develop pro' 65
cedural safeguards to protect against erroneous deprivation.'
The Governmental Model was also used when the dissent found
162. Judge Jones concurred in Mathias, stating that she was "constrained to concur...
solely because I read the Supreme Court's recent decision in Zinermon... as holding that
we must take a hard look at accidental deprivations of liberty or property to determine
whether additional procedural safeguards would have alleviated the problem." Id. at 1058
(Jones, J., concurring).
163. Cf Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1991), overruled in part by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (stating that prior cases do not require predeprivation hearing in presence of need for quick action).
164. Caine v. Hardy, 943 F.2d 1406, 1417 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 1474
(1992).
165. Caine, 943 F.2d at 1418.
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that predeprivation process was "practicable because revenge is at
issue ...."166 Under Hudson's Legalist approach, the disembodied
state could never predict that
particular state employees would en1 67
conduct.
vengeful
gage in
3.

Charbonnet v. Lee

The Section 1983 claim dismissed in Charbonnetv. Lee 168 would
be permitted under the Governmental Model. In Charbonnet, a
dentist sued a county sheriff who, in violation of departmental policy, intervened in a civil dispute and stood by as the dentist's partners removed the dentist's medical equipment. In applying the
Zinermon standards, the Charbonnet court argued that, as in
Caine, the harm to the plaintiff came "not from a lack of
foreseeably necessary 1' safeguards
but from a violation of control69
ling state regulations.'
Judge Wisdom, writing for the Charbonnetcourt, succinctly summarized both the effect of the Legalist Model and the rationale for
its use:
We acknowledge that Caine v. Hardy does much to swing shut the
door of the federal courts to suits for individual violations of procedural due process. Yet those doors remain open to a plaintiff such as
Dr. Charbonnet if the actions of the official were the result of some
established municipal procedure, or if the state does not offer an adequate remedy elsewhere.
A plaintiff like Dr. Charbonnet has not
17
lost his day in court. 1
B.

The Seventh Circuit: Easter House v. Felder

Like the en banc Fifth Circuit, the en banc Seventh Circuit followed the model set out in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Zinermon,
focusing solely on the Legalist Model and ignoring the Governmental Model. 171 In Easter House v. Felder,172 a private adoption
agency alleged a conspiracy by officials of the Illinois Department
166. Id.
167. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (stating that intentional acts are even more difficult
to anticipate).
168. 951 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 2994 (1992).
169. Id. at 643.
170. Id. at 645.
171. Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt DoctrineAfter Zinermon
v. Burch: EnsuringDue Process or Turning the FourteenthAmendment into a "Fontof Tort
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of Children and Family Services to deprive the agency of its operating license. The officials had delayed renewal of the license when
they learned that the director of Easter House intended to leave. 7 3
The officials informed Easter House by letter that the agency was
out of compliance with licensing standards. 74 If Easter House
wished to resume operations, it would have to reattain minimum
standards and reapply for a license. 75 This suspension was contrary to Illinois law. 1 76 Further, the officials incorrectly informed
two callers that Easter House was no longer licensed. 77 Less than
two months after learning of the pending departure of Easter
House's director, the state officials renewed Easter House's license
retroactively so that it never lost its authority to operate as an
78
adoption agency.'
The Seventh Circuit previously had struggled with the application of the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine in Easter House. Initially, a
Seventh Circuit panel had held that Easter House could bring its
Section 1983 claim.' 79 That decision was reversed by the en banc
Seventh Circuit, which used the Legalist Model to find that the
Parratt/Hudsondoctrine applied. 80 This decision in turn was vacated by the United States Supreme Court and remanded for reexamination in light of Zinermon. 8 ' It was after this already lengthy
consideration of Parratt/Hudsonthat the en banc Seventh Circuit
considered the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Zinermon.
Law", 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 445, 477 (1991) (observing that "philosophically, the majority
opinion in Easter House clearly parallels the wishes of Justice O'Connor").
172. 910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991).
173. Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1391.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. n.6.
177. EasterHouse, 910 F.2d at 1392. Under Illinois law, Easter House was permitted
to continue interim operations pending judicial review of the decision to withhold renewal
of the license. Id. at 1395 n.12.
178. Id. at 1392.
179. Easter House v. Felder, 852 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 879 F.2d 1458 (7th
Cir. 1989) (en banc), vacated, 494 U.S. 1014 (1990), rev'd on remand, 910 F.2d 1387 (7th
Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991).
180. Easter House v. Felder, 879 F.2d 1458 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), vacated, 494 U.S.
1014 (1990), affd on remand, 910 F.2d 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1067 (1991).
181. Easter House v. Felder, 494 U.S. 1014 (1990), opinion on remand, 910 F.2d 1387
(7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991).

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

1. The Majority Opinion
The Seventh Circuit signaled its intent to adhere to the Legalist
Model early in the opinion when it announced that Zinermon "did
82
not abandon the principles established by Parrattand Hudson.'
Just as the Fifth Circuit in Caine sought to distinguish Zinermon by
using illusory differences, 83 so the Seventh Circuit asserted,
"Easter House cannot demonstrate that the appellants' actions,
even if involving a conspiracy to destroy Easter House, were anything but a single instance of improper conduct involving multiple
employees engaged in a single scheme for a relatively short period
of time.' 1 84 The same is true, of course, for the plaintiff in
Zinermon. Mr. Burch did not demonstrate that the failure to apply
Florida's statutory requirements for involuntary commitment was
anything more than an isolated incident.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion does not account for the Governmental strand in Zinermon. Like the Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Caine v. Hardy, the majority in Easter House never cited nor discussed Monroe v. Pape.15 Instead, the Seventh Circuit exploited
the existence of the two contradictory models in Zinermon, finding
that:

182. Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1397 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991).
183. See discussion supra part IV.A (discussing Caine).
184. Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1399.
185. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); cf. Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1412 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (noting Zinermon's heavy reliance on Monroe v. Pape). Just as the Seventh Circuit ignored Monroe, other courts have ignored Zinermon. E.g., United of Omaha Life
Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 960 F.2d 31, 34-36 (6th Cir. 1992); Smith v. Massachusetts Dep't of
Corrections, 936 F.2d 1390 1402 (1st Cir. 1991); G.M. Eng'rs & Assocs. v. West Bloomfield
Township, 922 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1990). Still other courts cite to Zinermon for general
due process principles, but ignore it when discussing the applicability of the Parratt/Hudson
doctrine. See, e.g., Neal v. Miller, 778 F. Supp. 378, 385-86 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (citing
Zinermon only for its holding that Parratt applies to deprivations of liberty); Universal Sec.
Ins. Co. v. Koefoed, 775 F. Supp. 240, 243 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (citing Zinermon for its description of three types of due process claims, but ignoring Zinermon in concluding that Hudson
applies). The fact that many lower courts are failing to discuss the Supreme Court's most
recent precedent is perhaps due to the confusion generated by Zinermon's use of the two
contradictory models. Parratt and Hudson at least have the virtue of a rule that is easily
followed. But see Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights,
and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 13 (1991)
(describing split among lower courts after Parratt/Hudson).
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Zinermon hints that a "narrow" application of the Parrattrule may
be the appropriate course. It is apparent from the Court's rationale
that the dispositive factor in determining whether Parrattwill indeed
apply in a given situation is still whether the state actor's conduct is
"random and unauthorized" or, as the Court has rephrased it,
whether the state actor's conduct is "predictable and authorized."' 8 6

While ignoring the Governmental Model in Zinermon, the Seventh Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit in Caine v. Hardy, emphasized
those portions of the Zinermon opinion that used Legalist reasoning. For example, the Seventh Circuit rejected Easter House's argument that Parrattdid not apply to "high-ranking" state officials
by emphasizing Zinermon's discussion of the "uncircumscribed"
discretion given Florida mental-health officials. 87 The Seventh
Circuit therefore concluded that Zinermon did not apply Parratt
because of Florida's "statutory oversight."o ss Yet, the plaintiff in
89
Zinermon did not challenge Florida's statutory scheme.
The Seventh Circuit's adoption of the Legalist Model is evident
in its discussion of Zinermon's first and third standards, "predictability" and "random and unauthorized" conduct. 90 Rejecting
Easter House's argument that the alleged conspiracy by state officials could not be considered "random and unauthorized," the majority opinion acknowledged Zinermon's emphasis on

186. Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1400 (emphasis added). The quotation marks surrounding "predictable and authorized" are in the original Seventh Circuit opinion, but the
phrase is not found in Zinermon.
187. The rejection of Easter House's argument is appropriate because it confuses the
question of municipal liability under Monell with liability generally under § 1983. See discussion supra part IV. But here the Seventh Circuit is using the Legalist Model inappropriately to reach the correct result.
188. Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1401. If the plaintiff in Zinermon had challenged the
Florida statutory scheme, he would have challenged an established state procedure. Under
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine does
not apply to an established state procedure. The dissent in Easter House thus argues that
"the majority treads dangerously close to categorizing Zinermon as a Logan-type case."
Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1411 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); see also Lolling v. Patterson, 966
F.2d 230, 234 n.6 (7th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing Zinermon as case in which deprivation
occurred pursuant to statutory scheme); cf. discussion supra Part IV.A.1 (describing Fifth
Circuit's mischaracterization of Zinermon as involving deprivation "condoned" by Florida's lawmakers).
189. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 117-18 (observing that plaintiff did not frame his action as challenge to constitutional adequacy of Florida's mental health statutes).
190. See id. at 136-38 (noting "predictability," "possibility," and "random and unauthorized" standards).
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predictability, but then cited Hudson to conclude that, because a
conspiracy must be intentional, it could never be predicted by the
state. 191 The Seventh Circuit thus, in effect, eliminated any distinction between the "unauthorized" and "predictability" standards.
Any action contrary to state law can never be predicted, and therefore no procedural due process claim under Section 1983 can ever
be brought. This is an unadulterated Legalist analysis. 92
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit used a Legalist definition of the
"state" when noting that "Easter House points to nothing which
would indicate that the state knew or should have known that the
appellants or other state employees had disregarded the state's established procedure for processing renewal applications.' 1 93 Who
is this "state" if not the state's employees charged with executing
the state's laws? 94 The Seventh Circuit's definition of the state for
Section 1983 purposes views the state as an "abstract thing denominated a State" rather than as the "persons who are the agents of
the State in the denial of the rights which were intended to be secured.' 95 This disembodiment of the "state" is consistent with the
Legalist1 96Model, which accepts only the state's lawmakers as the
"state.'
It is, however, fundamentally inconsistent with the Governmental Model. 197 Moreover, taken to its logical conclusion, this
reasoning threatens to insulate all potential Section 1983 defendants' 98 from liability by the simple, formalistic device of enacting
191. See EasterHouse, 910 F.2d at 1399 (echoing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533
(1984) and noting that to extent conspiracy is intentional, such acts are difficult to
anticipate).
192. See discussion suprapart I.C.2 (describing Hudson's reliance on Legalist Model).
193. Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1401.
194. See id. at 1411 (Cudahy, J, dissenting) (noting majority's predicament in defining
"state").
195. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880); see discussion in Part I.B (describing
application of Governmental Model's definition of "state actor.").
196. See Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 439 (1904) (reasoning that unauthorized acts of state employee not attributable to state).
197. Cf Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt Doctrine After
Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Process or Turning the FourteenthAmendment into a
"Font of Tort Law", 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 445, 461 n.110 (1991) (describing distinction
between government and government officials as departure from precedent).
198. The possibility of insulation from liability is not limited to § 1983 defendants.
Constitutional tort claims against federal officers may be brought in an action based on
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
The Parratt/Hudsondoctrine, which interprets § 1983 and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, has been applied to Bivens claims against federal officers under
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state and local laws prohibiting deprivations of life, liberty, or
property without due process. 199
Finally, the Seventh Circuit majority opinion in Easter House
used the Legalist Model to import inappropriately the principles
developed for municipal liability under Section 1983 into general
liability principles under the Section. In rejecting the state officials' actions in Easter House as random and unauthorized, the majority identified only two ways in which a state actor's actions could
be considered authorized, thereby avoiding the Parratt/Hudson
doctrine. First, a policy change could be undertaken "if the same
formal steps which created the original policies and procedures are
repeated and culminate in the pronouncement of new policy and
procedures. ' '200 Second, a policy change could occur "if the poli-

cymaker repeatedly deviates from the formally established policy
and procedure until his practice and custom has [sic] replaced the

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. These cases concluded that a Bivens
claim could not be brought against a federal officer because of the adequate remedy found
in the Federal Tort Claims Act. E.g., Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983); Ramfrez v. Obermaier, No. 91-CIV-7120, 1992 WL 320985, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1992); Ekpo v. United States, No. 91-6418, 1992 WL 117121, at *1
(N.D. Ill. May 22, 1992). The use of the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine in cases against federal
officers fails to consider the rationale of the doctrine. One rationale is the fear of infringing on the sovereignty of the states, as discussed in Part V.B of this Article. This danger
does not arise when federal courts hear claims against federal officers. A related concern,
however, is the threat to the separation of powers posed whenever the federal courts hear
a Bivens claim against a federal officer. ERWIN

CHEMERINSKY,

FEDERAL JURISDICTION §

9.1.2 (1989) (discussing argument that Bivens claims offend separation of powers). The
"adequate state remedy" limitation in the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine has a counterpart in the
preclusion of Bivens claims where Congress has created a remedial scheme. Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). But see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (permitting
Bivens suit although Federal Tort Claims Act provided remedy).
199. See Seals v. Edwards, No. 91-2215, 1993 WL 5932, **2 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1993),
(noting that, carried to its logical conclusion, random and unauthorized standard "would
make it impossible for any plaintiff to successfully maintain a due process action under §
1983"); Smith v. McCaughtry, 801 F. Supp. 239, 242 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (stating that
Zinermon "left no doubt that Parrattand Hudson do not stand for the simplistic proposition that state officials can always escape § 1983 liability.., by simply characterizing their
conduct as an unauthorized departure from established state practices that is remediable,
after the fact, by an adequate state tort remedy"). Most states already have state constitutions with due process clauses. See, e.g., Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227
U.S. 278, 295 (1913) (rejecting claim of no state action because challenged action would
also violate Due Process Clause of California Constitution).
200. Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1403.
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formal policy and procedures."' 20 1 Although the court did not explain the derivation of these principles, they were precisely the
principles used under Monell v. Department of Social Services202 to
determine whether a municipality could be held liable under Section 1983. The Seventh Circuit ignored the common situation in
which a Section 1983 suit may be pursued against the individual
acting "under color of" state law, but may not be pursued against
the municipality, because 2under
Monell the challenged action is not
03
the municipality's policy.
The importation of these principles in Easter House is especially
ironic as Monell is irrelevant in a suit against state officials. The
Eleventh Amendment prohibits a Section 1983 suit against the
state directly. 2°4 But neither the Eleventh Amendment nor Monell

prohibits suit against state officials-the only defendants in Easter
House. The inability to bring suit against the state directly means,
of course, that a Section 1983 plaintiff is unable to recover damages
from the "deep pocket" of the state treasury. 2 5 But injunctive relief against state officials is available 206 and damages may be recov-

ered from individual state officials to the extent such officials have
assets that can be reached and to the extent such officers are not
protected by the various immunity doctrines.2 °7 The use of Monell

201. Id.; see Jones v. Doria, 767 F. Supp. 1432, 1440 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding single
deviation from state policy not equivalent of new state policy making defendant's actions
"authorized"); Duenas v. Nagle, 765 F. Supp. 1393, 1399 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (stating that
multiple violations of state policy would render defendants' acts "neither random nor

unauthorized").
202. 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978) (permitting municipal liability under § 1983 only where
action is pursuant to government's policy or custom).
203. Professor Oren describes Justice O'Connor's dissent in Zinermon as collapsing
the test for random and unauthorized acts under Parrattinto the Monell standard for municipal liability. Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, FederalRights, and
State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 22 (1991).
204. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 US. 332, 337 (1979) (holding Eleventh Amendment
immunizes state from liability under § 1983). While the Eleventh Amendment only applies
to suits against the state in federal court, states may not be sued in state court under § 1983.
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989).
205. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (holding Eleventh Amendment
prohibits retroactive relief such as award of damages).
206. Id. at 677.
207. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (providing defense of qualified immunity if reasonable official would have believed action was permissible).
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principles to determine general liability under Section 1983 is
therefore inappropriate.2 °8
2. Judge Easterbrook's Concurrence
In his concurrence, Judge Easterbrook began by recognizing that
"Zinermon . . . is inconsistent with the foundations of Parratt v.
Taylor ... and Hudson v. Palmer.2 0 9 Nevertheless, "despite the
force of [dissenting] Judge Cudahy's arguments," Judge Easterbrook agreed that Parratt/Hudsonshould apply because "Judge
Kanne offers the best estimate of the course
a majority of the
210
[Supreme] Court will take [in the future].
3.

Judge Cudahy's Dissent

Judge Cudahy in dissent described the principal failing of the
majority's opinion: "[It] unfortunately misses the point of
Zinermon .... ",211 For the dissenters, Zinermon taught that "for
purposes of determining whether the 'state' has violated an individual's constitutional right to due process, the 'state' generally in208. See Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and
State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 17 n.102 (1991) (noting that Monell establishes different standard of authorization than Monroe v. Pape and
Zinermon in order "to determine which defendant shall be held liable in § 1983 litigationthe government entity itself or only the individual officers whose misconduct caused the
injury"); id. at 25 (emphasizing that state sanctioning of wrong determines who pays for
injury, but does not establish existence of constitutional violation); cf Paul F. Wingenfeld,
Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt DoctrineAfter Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Process or Turning the FourteenthAmendment into a "Font of Tort Law", 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
445, 452 (1991) (concluding that Monell's reasoning is at odds with Monroe). But see
Karen M. Blum, Monell, DeShaney, and Zinermon: Official Policy, Affirmative Duty, Established State Procedure and Local Government Liability Under Section 1983, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 46 (1990) (arguing consistency achievable only if Zinermon is construed
consistently with Monell and Parratt);Edward R. Stabell, III, Note, Zinermon v. Burch:
Putting Brackets Around the Parratt Doctrine,42 MERCER L. REV. 1655, 1673 (1991) (proposing that Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), applying Monell, can be
used to determine whether state was able to provide predeprivation process); Paul F.
Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt DoctrineAfter Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Processor Turning the FourteenthAmendment into a "Font of Tort Law", 39 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 445, 466 (1991) (suggesting that Monell illustrates reach of Parratt and
Hudson).
209. Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1408 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991).
210. Id. at 1409.
211. Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1410 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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cludes any person to whom is delegated the responsibility of giving
predeprivation process. 212 In contrast to the majority, which
never cited Monroe v. Pape, the dissent noted that Zinermon "relied heavily" on Monroe.213 The dissent thus adopted the Governmental Model.
C. Application of the Legalist Model to Precluded Claims
In addition to the techniques used by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits to resurrect the Legalist Model, some courts have purported
to apply Parratt/Hudsonand the Legalist Model to cases in which
the Section 1983 plaintiff had already sought relief in the state
courts. Many of these cases were dismissed under the Legalist
Model; they should have been dismissed because the Section 1983
claim was precluded.
Claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars parties from litigating in a
subsequent action issues that actually were or could have been litigated in a prior action.214 If an individual uses state remedies to
challenge some action by a state actor, that individual can be precluded from bringing a subsequent Section 1983 action if the Section 1983 claim could have been brought in the initial state
proceeding.215 State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal courts over Section 1983 claims, and are obligated to hear
2 16
such Section 1983 claims if they hear other similar state claims.
Therefore, a federal court hearing a Section 1983 claim brought by
a plaintiff who has already used state judicial remedies should usually dismiss the Section 1983 claim on claim preclusion grounds.2 1 7
The only exception to such a dismissal would be in the unusual
212. Id. at 1411.
213. Id. at 1412.
214. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466-67 n.6 (1982) (describing operation of res judicata doctrine).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982) (stating that claims extinguished by first judgment shall include "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose"); see generally JACK FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PRO.
CEDURE §§ 14.1-.15 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing former adjudication).
216. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 379-90 (1990) (holding that state court's refusal to
hear § 1983 claim, when it would hear similar state law claims, violated Supremacy Clause).
217. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist., 465 U.S. 75, 87 (1984) (applying claim preclusion
to § 1983 claim brought in federal court by teacher who had already prevailed on state law
claims in state court).
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circumstance in which state law would not require preclusion.218 In
some of the cases that purport to apply Parratt/Hudsonand the
Legalist Model, dismissal was appropriate on claim preclusion
grounds instead.219
V.

RATIONALIZATIONS FOR THE LEGALIST MODEL

If Zinermon v. Burch dooms the lower courts to the Sisyphean
task of applying in a logical and rational manner Supreme Court
precedents using contradictory Legalist and Governmental Models,
one solution would be to select one of the two models. Why have
the lower courts turned to Parratt/Hudsonand its Legalist Model?
Many of the courts choosing the Legalist Model have ascribed two
reasons in support of their choice: (1) the "flood" of Section 1983
cases in the federal courts; and (2) federalism.220
A.

The "Flood" of Cases

The flood-of-cases argument suggests that the federal courts are
burdened 221 with a deluge of Section 1983 cases because decisions
218. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 provides, "The ... judicial proceedings of any court of any...
State ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such state."
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988); see Migra, 465 U.S. at 83 (applying § 1738 to a § 1983 claim); cf.
East Coast Novelty Co. v. City of New York, 781 F. Supp. 999, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (dismissing procedural due process claim but rejecting argument that prior state proceeding
precluded all § 1983 claims), reargument denied, 141 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
219. See, e.g., Zar v. South Dakota Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 976 F.2d 459,
465 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding by South Dakota Supreme Court of violation of state due
process clause in prior state action); Ricci v. Paolino, No. 91-1994, 1992 WL 63521, **4 (1st
Cir. Apr. 11, 1992) (per curiam) (dismissing claim in which plaintiff won $13,000 in state
court); Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 758 (1st Cir. 1990) (dismissing claim by land surveyor who earlier alleged due process deprivations before state board of claims, which
denied claim; New Hampshire Supreme Court denied review of state board of claims decision), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1041 (1991).
220. Cf Daniel S. Feder, Note, From Parratt to Zinermor Authorization, Adequacy,
and Immunity in a Systematic Analysis of State Procedure, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 83132 (1990) (explaining expansive availability of due process claims under § 1983 has raised
concerns over federalism, overburdening of federal courts, and trivialization of
Constitution).
221. The suggestion that § 1983 suits "burden" the federal courts implies that the suits
are usually frivolous. Justice Blackmun has wondered "why screening out frivolous suits
should be considered a problem peculiar to § 1983, rather than a part of a more general
problem of federal litigation that must be addressed on its own terms." Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain
Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 21 (1985).

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:1

like Monroe v. Pape22 2 have gone too far in extending liability
under the statute. 2 3 While there has been a dramatic increase in
the number of Section 1983 cases filed since the decision in
Monroe, there is little empirical evidence
that the federal courts
22 4
are "flooded" with Section 1983 cases.
A field study by Professors Schwab and Eisenberg of all 1980
and 1981 civil rights filings in three federal districts (the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, the Northern District of Georgia, and the
Central District of California) revealed that about 3 percent of the
federal civil docket in those districts consisted of nonprisoner constitutional tort filings, 2 5 and about 7 percent consisted of both pris222. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
223. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 554 n.30 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("I cannot help but think that the Court's holding is influenced by an unstated fear that if it
recognizes that prisoners have any Fourth Amendment protection, this will lead to a flood
of frivolous lawsuits"); Soldal v. County of Cook, 942 F.2d 1073, 1087 (7th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (Flaum, J., dissenting) (noting majority opinion's fear of torrent of litigation), rev'd
on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 538, 548 (1992) (rejecting "exaggerated" fear that permitting §
1983 Fourth Amendment claims will "federaliz[e]" areas of law traditionally the concern of
states); Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 957, 958 (7th Cir. 1991) (referring to "ubiquitous" § 1983); Theodore Eisenberg & Steven Schwab, The Reality of ConstitutionalTort
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 645 (1987) (finding dominant perception that § 1983
cases flood federal courts); id. at 646-50 (collecting cases expressing burden of perceived
flood of § 1983 cases); Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt Doctrine
After Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Process or Turning the Fourteenth Amendment
into a "Font of Tort Law", 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 445, 480 (1991) (proposing overruling
Monroe and reinstating Parratt to manage "overwhelming" number of federal § 1983
cases).
224. The number of private civil rights actions filed in the federal courts increased by
6,256 percent between 1960 and 1983. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS
AND REFORM 82 (1985). While Judge Posner does not blame Section 1983 for a flood of
cases in the federal courts, he does assert that the Fourteenth Amendment "is today the
direct or indirect source of much of the business of the federal courts." Id. at 52. Other
commentators are less precise, and incorrectly characterize all civil rights cases as Section
1983 cases. Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 661 (1987) (noting that commentators repeatedly mischaracterize all civil rights cases as § 1983 cases and bemoan their large numbers and
growth). This misclassification stems from the categories used by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Id. at 663.
225. "Constitutional tort" claims can be brought under § 1983 against state or local
officials, or against federal officers in an implied right of action based on the constitution.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Most
constitutional tort suits are brought under § 1983. Theodore Eisenberg & Steven Schwab,
The Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 654 (1987) (finding
there are few Bivens actions).
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oner and nonprisoner constitutional tort filings.22 6 This works out
to about two such cases per judge per month.2 7 While the number
of constitutional tort suits filed in the federal courts has increased,
like all lawsuits generally, the percentage that such suits constitute
of the federal courts' dockets has decreased since 1975.28
Even if Section 1983 claims are a small percentage of the docket,
they could still be burdensome if those cases were to result in large
damage awards to Section 1983 plaintiffs. Again, the Eisenberg/
Schwab study of the three federal districts demonstrated that the
fiscal burden on local governmental entities is not extreme. The
field study defined a successful Section 1983 suit broadly as one in
which the plaintiff settled or received a favorable court judgment.
The 364 successful Section 1983 suits brought in 1980-1981 recovered $2 million in court-awarded damages and $4.8 million in settlement.2 2 9 This total damages award of $6.8 million in one fiscal
year provided a per capita average of 35 cents per person in the
three districts. 230 These awards were compared to the budgets of
local governments in the three districts. In that year these local
governments had expenditures totalling $30.3 billion. The $6.8 million transferred because of Section 1983 litigation thus represented
about 0.02 percent of local government expenditures. 2 3 1 These
data are incomplete because they did not include the cost to local
government of defending these lawsuits. But it is unlikely that
such costs would make Section 1983 litigation a major factor in the
232
budgetary battles all governmental entities face today.
226. Steven J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant,73 CORNELL L. REv. 719, 725 (1988).
227. Id. Without a national survey, of course, the reliability of the Eisenberg/Schwab
surveys is less than complete. The omission of the Northern District of Illinois from their
studies, for example, may skew the results. Cases from the Northern District of Illinois
addressing the availability of the Parratt/Hudsondoctrine after Zinermon constituted 31 of
the 79 district court cases (or 39%). See supra Tables III, IV.
228. Theodore Eisenberg & Steven Schwab, The Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 666 (1987); Steven J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the
Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 756-57 (1988).
229. Id. at 736-37.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 739.
232. If the Legalist Model were to be applied, thus eliminating § 1983 as a source for
awards to plaintiffs, damages would still be awarded to the plaintiffs, but they would be
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To determine whether these findings reflect the reality facing the
federal courts today, the author surveyed Section 1983 cases
brought in the Texas federal courts from June 1, 1992, to June 1,
1993. This survey confirms that Section 1983 cases against local
governments do not present a "flood.12 33 The Fifth Circuit heard
twenty-four appeals involving Texas cities, counties, and school districts in which a Section 1983 claim was brought. Of these twentyfour appeals, eleven (or 46 percent) resulted in a decision favorable
to the plaintiff.2 34 Similarly, four appeals involving Section 1983
were heard in the Texas state courts. Of these four appeals, one
(or 25 percent) resulted in a decision favorable to the plaintiff.
Thus, a total of twenty-eight appeals involving Section 1983 were
brought in this one-year period against all Texas cities, counties,
and school districts. Texas has 1,171 cities, 235 254 counties, 236 and
about 1,100 school districts. 237 In this one-year period, the state
and federal court systems in Texas heard an average of 0.01 appeals
per local governmental entity.
The data in this survey of Texas cases are incomplete. The survey included only appeals, not cases filed in the trial courts of both
the federal and state court systems. The survey also did not include
information on settlements that would not appear in legal reporters. The survey's results were, however, consistent with the more
complete surveys discussed above that demonstrated that the purported "flood" of Section 1983 cases is, in fact, a trickle or, perhaps, a small stream. Certainly there does not appear to be any
awarded under state law rather than under § 1983. Litigation defense costs would still be
incurred. Precluding § 1983 claims might reduce costs incurred by local governments if the
"adequate" state remedy does not provide, as § 1983 does, for an award of punitive damages. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981) (holding state remedy with no
provision for punitive damages sufficient to satisfy requirements of due process), overruled
on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
233. Search of Westlaw, CTA5-ALL and TX-CS files (June 11, 1993).
234. Plaintiff "success" is defined broadly to mean any outcome other than dismissal
of the claim or affirmance of an adverse judgment. See Theodore Eisenberg & Steven
Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 681-82
(1987) (setting out broad definition of "success" used in study).
235. Number of Selected Geographic Entities, 1990 Census, available in Westlaw,
CENDATA database.
236. See TEx. CONST. art. IX, § 1 interp. commentary (stating that "all of the 254
Texas counties have been organized into administrative units").
237. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch I.S.D. v. Edgewood I.S.D., 826 S.W.2d 489, 495
(Tex. 1992) (noting decline in total number of school districts to between 1000 and 1100).
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emergency confronting the federal court system that would counsel
limiting the remedy commanded by Congress in Section 1983.
B.

Federalism

If there is no emergency flood of Section 1983 cases facing the
federal courts, perhaps the adoption of the Legalist Model is compelled by the Constitution. The federalism argument in support of
the Legalist Model seeks to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment
from becoming a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon
238
whatever systems may already be administered by the States.
The Seventh Circuit in Easter House explained:
Section 1983 must be preserved to remedy only those deprivations
which actually occur without adequate due process of law, such as
those which result from a state's conscious decision to ignore the protections guaranteed by the Constitution. It should not be employed
to remedy deprivations which occur at the hands of a state employee
who is acting in direct contravention of the state's established policies and procedures which have been designed to guarantee the very
protections which the employee now has chosen to ignore. Such a
limitation upon Section 1983 maintains the delicate balance between
the state and federal judicial systems, leaving the former to remedy
individual torts and the latter to address property deprivations which
occur without adequate due process protection. 39
Just as the majority in Easter House ignored the Governmental
line of cases in its analysis of Zinermon,2 40 so it ignored the Governmental line of cases in its discussion of federalism. Had the majority examined those cases, it would have had to consider the
rejection of this federalism argument by the Supreme Court in
1945 in Screws v. United States.241 Justice Douglas said in Screws:
[T]here is no warrant for treating the question in state law terms.
The problem is not whether state law has been violated but whether
238. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
701 (1976)), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)
239. Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1404-05 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991). See also Pacelli v. deVito, 972 F.2d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 1992)
(applying Parrattto dismiss claim by mental health patient who was confined past his release date and warning that future litigants should use state courts to pursue future claims).
240. See supra part IV.B.1 (noting that Easter House majority does not account for
Governmental strand in Zinermon).
241. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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an inhabitant of a State has been deprived of a federal right by one
who acts under "color of any law." The statute . . .is applicable
when and only when someone is deprived of a federal right by that

action. The fact that it is also a violation of state law does not make
it any the less a federal offense punishable as such. Nor does its
punishment by federal authority encroach on state authority or relieve the state from its responsibility for punishing state offenses.
We agree that when this statute is applied to the action of state
officials, it should be construed so as to respect the proper balance
between the States and the federal government in law enforcement.
...Congress in Section 20 of the Criminal Code did not undertake to
make all torts of state officials federal crimes. It brought within Section 20 only specified acts done "under color" of law and then only
those acts which deprived a person of some
right secured by the
2 42
States.
United
the
of
laws
or
Constitution

Similarly, the fact that a violation of Section 1983 is also a violation of state law does not make it any the less a federal offense
punishable as such. Permitting plaintiffs to bring claims under Section 1983 for "unauthorized" actions like those of the police officers in Monroe v. Pape raises no federalism problem2 43 because
there can be no intrusion on state sovereignty when the federal
courts enforce a statute like Section 1983 "which the people of the
of the United States, empowered
States have, by the Constitution
'244
Congress to [en]act.

242. Screws, 325 U.S. at 108-109; see id. at 131 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (finding fear
over maladjustment of federal-state relations not well grounded). Screws was brought
under § 20 of the Criminal Code which, like § 1983, prohibits certain acts "under color of"
state law. Id. at 108-09. Monroe v. Pape explicitly found that § 20 of the Criminal Code
and § 1983 should be interpreted similarly. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961),
overruled in parton other grounds by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
243. Ironically, the use of the federalism argument to limit the availability of § 1983
almost always overlooks the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts to hear § 1983
claims. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990) (holding that Florida courts must
hear § 1983 claim). The state judicial systems can be full partners with the federal courts in
the adjudication of § 1983 claims, but the federal courts continue to decide most § 1983
claims. In the survey of Texas appellate cases for a one-year period described in part V.A,
twenty-four § 1983 appeals were heard in the Fifth Circuit while only four appeals were
heard in the Texas state courts. See discussion supra part V.A.
244. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880); cf. Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct.
538, 548 (1992) (rejecting as "exaggerated" fear that permitting § 1983 Fourth Amendment
claim will federalize areas of law governed traditionally by states).
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A federalism problem would be raised if Congress were to enact
a statute without authority under the Constitution. Congress had
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact Section 1983.245 The power of Congress to redress "unauthorized" violations of rights by persons acting "under color of" state law has
been clear since Virginia v. Rives.246 Advocates of the Legalist
Model use federalism instead to complain that Congress has in fact
acted.247 When the Seventh Circuit suggested that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine avoids "the use of Section 1983 as just another opportunity for parties to shop between state and federal forums, '2 4 8 the
Circuit was really complaining that Congress, by enacting Section
1983, has in fact authorized "forum shopping. '2 49 Those who believe Section 1983 goes too far,25° or duplicates remedies already
provided by state law, or inhibits the development of state protections251 have a remedy: ask Congress to revoke or to amend Section 1983. If Section 1983 is actually a burden on the federal

245. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171 (reaffirming Congress's authority to enact legislation
to enforce Fourteenth Amendment "against those who carry a badge of authority of a
State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority
or misuse it.").
246. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
247. Many of the "federalism" arguments regarding § 1983 appear ahistorical for they
fail to recognize that the "Reconstruction Amendments, the Civil Rights Acts, and these
new [federal court] jurisdictional statutes, all emerging from the caldron of the War Between the States, marked a revolutionary shift in the relationship among individuals, the
States and the Federal Government." Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and FederalProtection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1, 6 (1985). But see The Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 82 (1873) (concluding
that post-Civil War constitutional amendments did not destroy preeminence of states as
protection against danger of strong federal government).
248. Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1404.
249. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183 (noting that state remedy need not be sought before
federal one, but that federal relief is supplementary).
250. See, e.g., Pacelli, 972 F.2d at 879 (asserting that damage suit under § 1983 is not
proper method to alter state officials' constitutional obligations).
251. Christina Whitman, ConstitutionalTorts, 79 MicH. L. REv. 5 (1979), cited in Paul
F. Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt Doctrine After Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Process or Turning the FourteenthAmendment into a "Font of Tort Law", 39
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 445, 459 n.98 (1991); Daniel S. Feder, Note, From Parratt to Zinermon:
Authorization, Adequacy, and Immunity in a Systematic Analysis of State Procedure, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 831, 837, 839-40 (1990). But see McClendon v. Turner, 765 F. Supp. 251,
255 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (finding that to consider an action "unauthorized" because it violates
state tort law would be repetitive and inefficient drain on judicial resources).
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courts252

or has otherwise undesirable consequences, Congress can
253
change it.
That Congress has provided a "supplementary remedy" through
Section 1983254 does not mean that the federal statute duplicates
the tort systems developed by each of the states. Section 1983 only
prohibits actions that deprive a plaintiff of rights under federal law.
Some wrongful actions are not prohibited by federal law. The neg5 6
255
ligent loss of the hobby kit in Parrattv. Taylor is one example.
How then, can we reconcile the broad remedy enacted by Congress
in Section 1983 with the inherent limits of any federal remedy?
How can we escape the Section 1983 Wonderland?
VI.

ESCAPING THE SECTION 1983 WONDERLAND

Parratt,Hudson, and Zinermon have led the lower courts into a
Wonderland they have been unable to escape. One way out of the
Section 1983 Wonderland would be to eliminate the "random and
unauthorized" test established in Parratt and extended in
Hudson.257
252. See discussion supra part V.A (describing the lack of evidence for any such
burden).
253. Screws, 325 U.S. at 113; cf Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics & Intelligence Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993) (rejecting heightened pleading standard for § 1983 cases, which must be obtained by process of amending Federal Rules, and
not by judicial interpretation); Parratt,451 U.S. at 553-54 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting it is time for revision of § 1983). See Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal
Protectionof Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 23 (1985) (federalism arguments regarding § 1983 are best addressed to Congress,
not to courts); Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and
State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 27 (1991) (arguing
that because Congress has not acted to amend § 1983, Supreme Court "effectively took
matters into its own hands, using constitutional doctrine instead of statutory amendment").
Such judicial activism is, of course, unjustified. Id. at 35.
254. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183 (holding that state remedy need not be sought
before bringing § 1983 claim).
255. 451 U.S. 527, 529 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986).
256. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986) (holding negligent acts do
not state § 1983 due process claim).
257. Another route out of the § 1983 Wonderland would be to limit § 1983 to "those
cases in which 'state compensation proves inadequate.' This is, after all, the very goal that
Justice Douglas sought in his majority opinion in Monroe." Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note,
Section 1983 and the Parratt Doctrine After Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Process or
Turning the FourteenthAmendment into a "Font of Tort Law", 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 445,
467 (1991). The proposal overlooks the fact that Illinois law provided the plaintiff in
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Stare Decisis and the Parratt/Hudson Rule

Eliminating the random and unauthorized test would require the
Supreme Court to overrule Parratt v. Taylor,258 which established
the rule, and Hudson v. Palmer,2- 9 which extended the rule to intentional deprivations. Before considering why the test should be
eliminated, the propriety of overruling these two cases (as well as
Zinermon, to the extent that case retains the test) must be
determined.
Our legal system operates on the doctrine of stare decisis. Stare
decisis is valued because it "promotes the evenhanded, predictable,
and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. "' 26 0 Fidelity to precedent "is funda' 2 61
mental to 'a society governed by the rule of law.'

Monroe with an adequate remedy. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), overruled in
part on other grounds by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Parratt already permits a § 1983 claim when the state's postdeprivation remedy is inadequate.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541-542 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986). Moreover, the proposal appears to overrule Monroe's holding, affirmed
in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982), that state remedies need not be
exhausted before bringing a § 1983 claim. But see Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983
and the Parratt Doctrine After Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Process or Turning the
Fourteenth Amendment into a "Font of Tort Law", 39 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 445, 480 (1991)

(proposing to overrule Monroe and Patsy).
258. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
Because of the holding in Daniels that negligent acts are never actionable under § 1983, the
result in a Parratt-typecase would be the same even if the random and unauthorized test
were eliminated: the § 1983 claim would still be dismissed. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335-36.
259. 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Unlike the effect on Parratt,eliminating the random and
unauthorized test would possibly lead to a different result in Hudson: the prisoner might
be able to state a § 1983 claim for the intentional assault. See supra part VI.B (discussing
Hudson). The same result might be reached in Hudson by affirming the broad authority of
prison officials and the narrow range of protected interests of prisoners. See Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983) (denying prisoner's § 1983 claim because prison officials
have broad discretion over prison affairs and because prisoners retain only narrow range of
protected interests). But see Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and FederalProtection of
Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21
(1985) (speculating that improvements in prisons are traceable to § 1983 actions).
260. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
261. Id. at 2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)).
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Nevertheless, stare decisis is "not an inexorable command ,' 262
nor "'an imprisonment of reason.' ' 2 63 The overruling of a prece'' 264 of
dent is appropriate when there is an "extraordinary showing
"special justification. '265 Special justifications for the overruling of
a precedent include: (1) later changes or developments in the law
that undermine a decision's rationale; (2) the need to bring a precedent into agreement with experience and with newly ascertained
facts; and (3) a showing that a precedent has become a detriment
266
to coherence and consistency in the law.
The Parratt/Hudsondoctrine as developed in Zinermon meets
the second and third of these "special justification" standards. We
now have three years of experience in the lower courts with the
Zinermon standard. As illustrated in Part III of this Article, that
experience demonstrates that the standard does not work. The
confusion generated by the use of the conflicting Legalist and Governmental Models in Zinermon has prevented coherence and consistency in the law. 67 As Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted, "when
governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, 'this
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.' "268 In Payne
v. Tennessee,269 a majority of the Court overruled its recent decisions in Booth v. Maryland270 and South Carolina v. Gathers27 1 in
262. Payne, 111 S.Ct. at 2609.
263. Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
264. Payne, 111 S.Ct. at 2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
265. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (noting that departure from stare
decisis demands special justification), cited in Payne, 111 S.Ct. at 2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 2618 (Souter, J., concurring).
266. Id. at 2621-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
267. Cf Paul F. Wingenfeld, Note, Section 1983 and the Parratt Doctrine After
Zinermon v. Burch: Ensuring Due Process or Turning the Fourteenth Amendment into a
"Fontof Tort Law," 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 445, 477 (1991) (asserting that "[i]f the Supreme
Court had simply overruled the Parrattdoctrine in its Zinermon decision, then the majority
in EasterHouse would not have had the freedom to maintain its broad application of Parratt and thereby sidestep any application of Zinermon").
268. Payne, 111 S.Ct. at 2609 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)).
The danger that the random and unauthorized test might be applied to other kinds of
constitutional violations also supports the rejection of the test. See Laura Oren, Signing
Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After
Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 74 (1991) (advocating rejection of test because of risk of
application to other kinds of constitutional violations).
269. 111 S.Ct. 2597 (1991).
270. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (1991).
271. 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
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part because the two decisions had "defied consistent application
by the lower courts." 272 While Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out
in his opinion in Payne that constitutional interpretations are more
likely to be overruled because correction through legislative action
in those cases is impossible,273 Zinermon's statutory interpretation
is nonetheless an appropriate candidate for overruling because it
considers the rights available under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and presumably incorporates the federalism concerns articulated in Parrattand Hudson. The Court previously has overruled interpretations of Section 1983274 and other
statutes275 when appropriate. The experience in the lower courts
with the current Zinermon tests satisfies standards for overturning
precedent expressed by the opinions in Payne.276
B. A Proposed New Standard: Return to the Pre-Parratt
Standards
The random and unauthorized standard announced in Parrattv.
Taylor277 was novel in that this precise standard had never before
been used in the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting Section
272. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611. Other factors noted by the majority include decisions
"by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinning of
[the] decision[ ]" and "questioning by members of the Court in later decisions." Id. The
Court in Parrattnoted that prior decisions
have not aided the various Courts of Appeals and District Courts in their struggle to
determine the correct manner in which to analyze claims such as the present one
which allege facts that are commonly thought to state a claim for a common-law tort
normally dealt with by state courts, but instead are couched in terms of a constitutional deprivation and relief is sought under § 1983. The diversity in approaches is
legion.
Parratt,451 U.S. at 533.
273. Payne, 111 S.Ct. at 2610.
274. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (overruling portion of Parratt
that held negligence amounted to deprivation under Due Process Clause); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700 (1978) (overruling portion of Monroe that held
municipalities were never liable under § 1983).
275. See Payne, 111 S.Ct. at 2618 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965), overruling Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153,
155 (1962) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2281); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977), overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)
(interpreting § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1)).
276. Payne, 111 S.Ct. at 2611 (describing factors used in overruling precedent) (majority opinion); id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Rumsey's "special justification" standard for overruling precedent); id. at 2621 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Rumsey).
277. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
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1983 or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 278
But the standard was developed from firmly grounded due process
principles. As Parratt explained, prior cases had approved of
postdeprivation remedies provided by the State when there was
"the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of
providing any meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled
with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess
the propriety of the State's action at some time after the initial
taking .... 279 In Parrattthere was no need for quick action. Instead, the impracticalityof providing predeprivation process for the
unexpected loss of a hobby kit was the basis of the holding in Parratt. Parratt'suse of the random and unauthorized standard, its observation that the loss was not the result of an "established state
procedure," and its emphasis on the state's ability to predict the
deprivation were unnecessary elaborations of the basic principle
announced in prior cases: predeprivation process is not required
when it is impractical to provide it. 280 Without these unnecessary
elaborations, the Court still could have concluded that it is "not
only impracticable, but impossible, to provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation. ' 281 It is these elaborations that
278. Cf. Michael A. Pavlick, Comment, Zinermon v. Burch: The Court Shoots Down
a Parratt, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1133, 1136 (1989-90) (noting Court in Parratt,Hudson,
and Daniels introduced new twist in certain § 1983 claims: availability of state remedies).
279. Parratt,451 U.S. at 539.
280. See id. at 541 (recognizing states do not have to provide hearing prior to initial
deprivation when it is impractical to do so); Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1412
(7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (commenting on
principles in Zinermon). For Judge Cudahy, the "gist" of Zinermon is that its principles
apply to all situations in which state officials charged with implementing a statute fail
to provide constitutionally required predeprivation process when to do so would not
be impossible or impracticable .... Mathews v. Eldridge[ ] is not ... concerned with
whether the property deprivation occurred pursuant to a "formal" or "informal" state
policy, but rather whether predeprivation process was feasible.
Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1412 (Cudahy, J. dissenting); Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven:
Zinermon v. Burch, FederalRights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape,
40 EMORY L.J. 1, 18 (1991) (noting that Zinermon "is about the feasibility of providing
predeprivation process"); id. at 38 ("Justice Rehnquist's discussion of 'established state
procedures' is quite unnecessary to the result in Parratt. The impracticability of providing
prior process itself sets Parrattapart.").
281. Parratt,451 U.S. at 541; cf Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990) (noting
"Parrattand Hudson represent a special case of the general Mathews v. Eldridge analysis,
in which postdeprivation tort remedies are all the process that is due, simply because they
are the only remedies the State could be expected to provide") (emphasis added). The
result in Parrattwould still be the same, both because it would be impractical to provide
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detoured the Court onto the Legalist track in both Hudson"2 and
Zinermon.
Parratt'sunnecessary elaborations became two of the three tests
used in Zinermon v. Burch to determine whether the Parratt/Hudson doctrine should be applied to Mr. Burch's claim.283 Of the
three tests set out in Zinermon, only the second test-whether
predeprivation process was not impossible-is consistent with the
pre-Parrattstandards for permitting postdeprivation remedies to
satisfy due process. If predeprivation process is impossible, it is
obviously impractical as well.
Whether a defendant's conduct was authorized, the third
Zinermon test, is irrelevant to a consideration of whether
predeprivation process is required because it is impractical or there
is a need for quick action. The third test is consistent with the Legalist Model. It is inconsistent with the Governmental Model used
in the earliest interpretations of Section 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment discussed previously in Part I.B of this Article, and
applied in Monroe v. Pape.2 It is largely responsible for the postZinermon confusion among the lower courts illustrated in Part IV
of this Article. The third Zinermon test should therefore be eliminated as a factor in deciding whether predeprivation process is
required.
Predictability, the first of the Zinermon tests, could be retained
in the calculus of determining whether predeprivation process is
required, but only if predictability is applied in a manner consistent
with the Governmental Model. Whether a deprivation is predictable should be considered, not from the perspective of a disempredeprivation process and because negligent acts are no longer a deprivation under the
Due Process Clause. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (overruling in part
Parratt).
282. Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Parrattemphasized the availability of a due
process claim when the state "through its employees, deliberately inflicted the harm .... "
Parratt,451 U.S. at 546. Justice White joined Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Parratt,
but joined in the majority in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 519 (1984). Justice Blackmun
also concurred in Hudson's discussion of Parratt. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part).
283. The three tests are whether (1) the deprivation was not "unpredictable"; (2)
predeprivation process was not "impossible"; and (3) defendant's conduct was not "unauthorized." Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 136-138.
284. 365 U.S. 167, overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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bodied state entity, but from the perspective of the "persons who
are the agents of the State in the denial of the rights which were
intended to be secured." '85 While the disembodied state entity
might be unable to predict that the prison guard in Hudson v.
Palmer would deprive Mr. Palmer of property without a hearing,
the prison guard himself-"the agent[ ] of the State in the denial of
the rights"-is certainly able to predict the deprivation. 86 Legalist
interpretations of "predictability" that only duplicate the discarded
"random and unauthorized" test should be overruled.2 87
Because predictability is merely one factor in determining
whether predeprivation process is "impractical," retaining it as a
separate test only increases the risk of returning the courts to the
Section 1983 Wonderland by reviving Legalist interpretations of
predictability. A return to the pre-Parrattstandards would ensure
consistency with the general principles of the Due Process
Clause, 88 and avoid reentry into the Section 1983 Wonderland in
the future. The Supreme Court should therefore permit Section
285. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880); see discussion supra part IV.B.1
(describing use of Legalist definition of state in Easter House).
286. See Parratt,451 U.S. at 546 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that "while the
'random and unauthorized nature' of negligent acts by state employees makes it difficult
for the State to 'provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place,' . . . it is
rare that the same can be said of intentionalacts by state employees") (emphasis added).
287. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (determining that "[tihe state can no more anticipate
and control in advance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees
than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct"); Pacelli v. deVito, 972 F.2d 871, 877 (7th
Cir. 1992) (implying that errors in length of custody of mental health patient, while inevitable, are not predictable since Parratt doctrine is applied after being raised by court sua
sponte); Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1404 (declaring that § 1983 should not be used to remedy deprivations in contravention of established state policies and procedures). Since
these decisions effectively eliminated any distinction between the unauthorized test and
the predictability test (see discussion supra part IV.B.1 (discussing Easter House)), the
elimination of the unauthorized test also requires elimination of the predictability test as
applied in these and similar cases. See Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v.
Burch, Federal Rights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY
L.J. 1, 45-46 (1991) (describing failings of predictability standard that force courts to make
distinctions without difference).
288. See Daniels,474 U.S. at 331 (Rehnquist, J.) ("Historically, this guarantee of due
process has been applied to deliberate [emphasis in original] decisions of government officials [emphasis added] to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property .... By requiring
the government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents [emphasis added] decide
to 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,' the Due Process Clause promotes fairness in such decisions."). Professor Oren has pointed out that the same result would be
reached in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), if it were analyzed as to
whether a prior hearing was "feasible" rather than whether there was an "established"
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1983 procedural due process claims challenging deprivations without predeprivation hearings except when there is a need for quick
action or when it is impractical to provide the predeprivation
hearing.289
By returning to pre-Parrattstandards, the Supreme Court would
return to well-established principles that can lead the lower courts
out of the Section 1983 Wonderland. 29 Under these principles,
many cases dismissed under Parrattwould still be dismissed because a predeprivation hearing would be impracticable or impossible,29 ' or because there is a need for quick action. 29 With wellestablished limits on Section 1983 claims already in place,293 there
should be no danger of transforming Section 1983 into the "font of

state procedure. Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights,
and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 41 (1991).
289. This is consistent with Professor Oren's analysis of Zinermon. "Zinermon
teaches that where predeprivation process is practicable and state officials have the authority and power to afford it, their acts are not 'random and unauthorized' as in Parrattand
Hudson, even if state law does not sanction the misconduct." Laura Oren, Signing Into
Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, FederalRights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe
v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 19 (1991).
290. Cf. Edward R. Stabell, III, Note, Zinermon v. Burch: Putting Brackets Around
the Parratt Doctrine,42 MERCER L. REV. 1655, 1671 (1991) (noting that Zinermon "implicitly places Parrattinto a well-developed line of procedural due process cases employing the
Mathews risk analysis").
291. See Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and
State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 67 and n.394 (1991)
(describing Katz v. Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1990) and Coriz v. Martfnez, 915
F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) as genuine Parratt cases because predeprivation process
impracticable).
292. See, e.g., Warren v. City of Grand Rapids, No. 92-1813, 1993 WL 150293, *'1 (6th
Cir. May 7, 1993) (concluding that car impoundment was justified by need for quick action
to ensure safety of streets); Easter House, 910 F.2d at 1410 (Easterbrook, J., concurring)
(asserting that strong state interest in protecting children justifies abrupt handling of adoption agencies); Dillman v. Peterson, Nos. C-93-1772 DLJ,C-93-1606 DLJ, 1993 WL 226104,
*3 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 1993) (reasoning need for quick action justifies removal of child
from custody while mother was hospitalized). But see Caine v. Hardy, 943 F.2d 1406, 1420
(5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Williams, J., dissenting) (arguing that to permit public hospital to
deprive doctor of his license based on patient safety "constitutes a license to any public
agency to deprive someone of a special right by stating a ground which would constitute an
emergency-with no proof thereof-and then prevail in a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal"), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992).
293. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335-36 (holding § 1983 does not reach negligent acts);
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (limiting municipal liability
under § 1983 to acts done pursuant to municipal policy or custom); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 645-46 (1987) (describing availability of qualified immunity defense).
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tort law" feared by so many courts. 294 At the same time, Section
1983 would be preserved to ensure that in the "twentieth century
bureaucratic5 state, each citizen is entitled to justice in the individ29
ual case.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Zinermon has
stranded the lower courts in a Section 1983 Wonderland. The
lower courts are doomed to remain in that Wonderland so long as
the Supreme Court continues to apply inconsistent approaches,
such as the Governmental Model and the Legalist Model, to Section 1983. The rationale supporting the use of the Legalist Model
has little support in the reality facing the federal courts today or in
prior interpretations of the post-Civil War civil rights statutes and
amendments. Escaping the Wonderland is possible if the Court is
willing to recognize the incoherence that has developed in the
lower courts and to limit deprivations of life, liberty, and property
without a predeprivation hearing to those situations in which there
is a need for immediate action, or where it is impractical to provide
a predeprivation hearing.
Will the Supreme Court tell us, please, which way we ought to go
from here?

294. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (warning of the possibility that unchecked
liability on state could lead to flood of tort cases).
295. Laura Oren, Signing Into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, FederalRights, and State
Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 70 (1991) (describing basic
duties of government to treat public fairly).
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APPENDIX I
Published decisions of the courts of appeals using the Governmental Model are:
Second Circuit: Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 940
F.2d 775, 777 (2d Cir. 1991) (challenging denial of status as chief
resident), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 657 (1991).
Fourth Circuit: Plumer v. Maryland, 915 F.2d 927, 928 (4th Cir.
1990) (challenging revocation of driver's license); Fields v. Durham, 909 F.2d 94, 95 (4th Cir. 1990) (challenging termination of
employment by community college dean), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
786 (1991).
Fifth Circuit: Matthias v. Bingley, 906 F.2d 1047, 1050-51 (5th
Cir.) (complaining of seizure and disposal of property pursuant to
city ordinance), modified on other grounds, 915 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.
1990).
Sixth Circuit: Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353, 1356 (6th Cir.
1993) (challenging refusal to permit figure-skating coach wrongfully accused of child abuse to use municipal ice rink).
Published courts of appeals decisions using the Legalist Model
are:
First Circuit: Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. East Providence, 970
F.2d 996, 997 (1st Cir. 1992) (challenging denial of application for
approval of liquor license transfer by drug store); Monahan v.
Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 988 (1st Cir. 1992)
(seeking damages for injuries suffered by voluntary mental patient
who jumped out of mental health center van); Lowe v. Scott, 959
F.2d 323, 325 (1st Cir. 1992) (challenging restriction preventing
doctor from supervising nurse midwives); Amsden v. Moran, 904
F.2d 748, 751 (1st Cir. 1990) (challenging revocation of land surveyor's license), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 713 (1991).
Second Circuit: Katz v. Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204, 205-06 (2d
Cir. 1990) (alleging mismanagement of building and failure of city
to supervise housing development).
Fifth Circuit: Charbonnet v. Lee, 951 F.2d 638, 639-40 (5th Cir.)
(complaining that deputy sheriff present when dentist's partners
removed partnership property from office), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2994 (1992); Caine v. Hardy, 943 F.2d 1406, 1407 (5th Cir. 1991)
(en banc) (challenging loss of staff privileges by anesthesiologist at
public hospital), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992).

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:66

Sixth Circuit: Doe v. Sullivan County, 956 F.2d 545, 548-49 (6th
Cir. 1992) (seeking damages for sexual assault by another prison
inmate), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 187 (1992).
Seventh Circuit: Pacelli v. deVito, 972 F.2d 871, 873-74 (7th Cir.
1992) (challenging confinement in mental health facility past release date); Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 794-95 (7th Cir.
1992) (contending civil commitment against plaintiff's will); Lolling
v. Patterson, 966 F.2d 230, 23-33 (7th Cir. 1992) (asserting civil
rights violation in deputy sheriff's suspension without pay); Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 957, 958-59 (7th Cir. 1991) (charging violation of § 1983 in delay in receipt of disability benefits by
former fire fighter); New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Village
of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1475-76 (7th Cir. 1990) (challenging
denial of building permit due to alleged racial animus); Easter
House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1389-90 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(asserting § 1983 violation in denial of operating license to private
adoption agency), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1067 (1991).
Eighth Circuit: Zar v. South Dakota Bd. of Examiners, 976 F.2d
459, 462-63 (8th Cir. 1992) (bringing suit based on state proceedings which alleged ethical violations, false statements, and Medicaid fraud).
Ninth Circuit: Erdman v. Cochise County, 926 F.2d 877, 878 (9th
Cir. 1991) (alleging arrest and incarceration twice on same
charges).
Tenth Circuit: Coriz v. Martfnez, 915 F.2d 1469, 1470 (10th Cir.
1990) (suing high school gym teacher and teacher's aide for student's injuries), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
Published decisions of the courts of appeals using the Governmental Model in dicta are:
District of Columbia Circuit: Propert v. District of Columbia,
948 F.2d 1327, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (challenging established state
procedure of towing and then destroying "junk" vehicles).
Second Circuit: Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 70-71 (2d Cir.
1990) (claiming due process violation for termination of mentally
retarded son's individual education placement).
Ninth Circuit: Sierra Lake Reserve v. City of Rocklin, 938 F.2d
951, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 31
(1992), retained in pertinent part on remand, 987 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.
1993) (challenging rent control ordinance).
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Published decisions of the courts of appeals using the Legalist
Model in dicta are:
Sixth Circuit: Macene v. MJW, Inc. 951 F.2d 700, 702-03 (6th
Cir. 1991) (alleging due process violation in excluding corporation's site from waste management plan); Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 934 F.2d 726, 727-28 (6th Cir. 1991) (claiming employee has
property right to pretermination hearing).
Seventh Circuit: Soldal v. County of Cook, 942 F.2d 1073, 1074
(7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (alleging procedural due process violation
when trailer park employees disconnected trailer and towed it
while sheriff's deputies observed), rev'd on other grounds, 113 S.
Ct. 538 (1992); Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499, 500-01
(7th Cir. 1990) (asserting property interest in delayed child abuse
investigation).
Eleventh Circuit: McKinney v. Pate, 985 F.2d 1502, 1503 (11th
Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiff was deprived of substantive due
process under binding circuit precedent despite panel's belief that
claim was procedural due process precluded under Parratt),vacated
and reh'g en banc granted, 994 F.2d 772 (11th Cir. June 17, 1993).
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APPENDIX II
Unpublished decisions of the courts of appeals using the Governmental Model are:
Fourth Circuit: Hayes v. Poe Homes Hous. Project Management, No. 90-3106, 1991 WL 68812, at *1 (4th Cir. May 3, 1991)
(per curiam) (alleging that Baltimore City Housing Authority denied tenant due process by refusing to remove his name from lease
when tenant was institutionalized and then evicting tenant after refusing to accept co-tenant's portion of rent); Mananioba v. Fairmont Hous. Auth., No. 90-3098, 1991 WL 1819, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan.
14, 1991) (per curiam) (challenging eviction from publicly subsidized housing).
Sixth Circuit: Seals v. Edwards, No. 91-2215, 1993 WL 5932, at
*1 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1993) (per curiam) (alleging improper finding
of guilt of minor misconduct violation and placement in "top
lock").
Unpublished decisions of the courts of appeals using the Legalist
Model are:
First Circuit: Brierly v. Brierly, No. 92-1916, 1993 WL 101434, at
*1-*2 (1st Cir. Apr. 6, 1993) (per curiam) (alleging deprivation of
due process for prosecution for failure to pay child support during
announced amnesty period); G6mez-Frau v. Acevedo Cruz, No.
91-242, 1992 WL 83782, at *1-*2 (1st Cir. Apr. 28, 1992) (per
curiam) (alleging that city removed fences and destroyed property
and hydraulic installations when it trespassed on plaintiff's property); Ricci v. Paolino, No. 91-1994, 1992 WL 63521, at *1 (1st Cir.
Apr. 1, 1992) (per curiam) (challenging loss of trucks, construction
equipment, and supplies seized in a criminal matter).
Sixth Circuit: Hebestreit v. Brown, No. 92-1798, 1993 WL
206535, at *1 (6th Cir. June 10, 1993) (alleging destruction of property without hearing); Warren v. City of Grand Rapids, No. 921813, 1993 WL 150293, at *1 (6th Cir. May 7, 1993) (challenging
police impoundment of car); Sanders v. Hofbauer, No. 92-1337,
1993 WL 128498, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 1993) (per curiam) (alleging former prisoner deprived of "good time" credits); Staffney v.
Robledo, No. 92-2020, 1993 WL 20539, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 1993)
(challenging termination from kitchen job and issuance of "misconduct" to prisoner); Fry v. Elleby, No. 92-1405, 1992 WL 276715, at
*1 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 1992) (challenging denial of kitchen job to pris-
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oner); Hunt v. City of Detroit, No. 92-1130, 1992 WL 259331, at *1
(6th Cir. Oct. 5, 1992) (challenging deprivation of prisoner's property in forfeiture proceeding), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1328 (1993).
Seventh Circuit: Ceszyk v. Cuneo, No. 91-3898, 1993 WL
186076, at *4 (7th Cir. June 1, 1993) (alleging that filing of lis
pendens notice or lien deprived plaintiff of property without due
process); Gray v. Houser, No. 88-2834, 1992 WL 340418, at *1 (7th
Cir. Nov. 19, 1992) (alleging deprivation of property and invasion
of privacy of prisoner); McChristion v. Duckworth, No. 91-2518,
1992 WL 311864, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 1992) (alleging deprivation
of property of prisoner without due process); Taheri v. Cook
County Hosp., No. 90-1543, 1991 WL 46531, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 5,
1991) (challenging termination of county employee).
Ninth Circuit: Hodgson v. Waters, No. 91-15299, 1992 WL
55856, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 1992) (alleging wrongful disclosure
of confidential information regarding prisoner's rape charge and
previous criminal record); Clayton v. Blogett, No. 91-35301, 1992
WL 8144, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1992) (alleging that hearing officer's refusal to consider exculpatory testimony at disciplinary
hearing violated due process); Addleman v. Washington State, No.
89-35668, 1991 WL 199680, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 1991) (alleging
that prison officials permitted other inmates to make unauthorized
copies of plaintiff's software); Knight v. Sanders, No. 89-15654,
1991 WL 138817, at *1 (9th Cir. July 26, 1991) (alleging that police
department and officers negligently lost plaintiff's impounded car).
No unpublished decision of the courts of appeals used the Governmental or Legalist Models in dictum.
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APPENDIX III
Published decisions of the district courts using the Governmental
Model are:
First Circuit: Lanmar Corp. v. Rendine, 811 F. Supp. 47, 48
(D.R.I. 1993) (challenging revocation of building permit); MacDowell v. Manchester Fire Dep't, 769 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D.N.H.
1990) (seeking recovery for injuries sustained after fire station captain provoked fight).
Second Circuit: Roach v. City of New York, 782 F. Supp. 261,
262-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (complaining of placement on involuntary
medical leave of absence); Koncelik v. Town of East Hampton, 781
F. Supp. 152, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (challenging denial of requested
zoning variance and conditional approval of subdivison waiver application); Ortfz v. Regan, 749 F. Supp. 1254, 1255-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (challenging termination of advanced retirement payments
and reduction of monthly retirement benefits).
Third Circuit: McClendon v. Turner, 765 F. Supp. 251, 252 (W.D.
Pa. 1991) (complaining that detective confiscated tax refund
check).
Fourth Circuit: Christian v. Cecil County, Md., 817 F. Supp.
1279, 1282-83 (D. Md. 1993) (challenging failure to provide former
county employees with pretermination hearing); Hodge v. Carroll
County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F. Supp. 593, 595-96 (D. Md.
1992) (complaining of investigation of report of suspected child
abuse); Bockes v. Fields, 798 F. Supp. 1219, 1220-21 (W.D. Va.
1992) (challenging termination of former director of county social
services); Pritchett v. Lanier, 766 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D.S.C. 1991)
(challenging removal of wrecker service operator from Highway
Department's rotation list), aff'd on other grounds, 973 F.2d 307
(4th Cir. 1992); McDonald v. Dunning, 760 F. Supp. 1156, 1158-59
(E.D. Va. 1991) (alleging false arrest and jailing for sentence already served).
Fifth Circuit: Price v. Carpenter, 758 F. Supp. 403, 405-06 (N.D.
Tex.) (describing attorney's challenge of county sheriff's failure to
hold hearing before exemption under Texas Bail Bond Act was revoked), aftd, 951 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
2942 (1992).
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Sixth Circuit: Loukas v. Hofbauer, 784 F. Supp. 377, 378 (E.D.
Mich. 1991) (discussing inmate's challenge of delay in holding
hearing).
Seventh Circuit: Smith v. McCaughtry, 801 F. Supp. 239, 241
(E.D. Wis. 1992) (reviewing challenge by inmate of placement in
adjustment segregation); Medicare HMO v. Bradley, 788 F. Supp.
1460, 1462-63 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (noting HMO's attempt to prevent
state official from cancelling Medicaid contract without cause);
DeSouto v. Cooke, 751 F. Supp. 794, 796-97 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (analyzing prisoner's allegations that officials took legal and personal
documents under false pretexts); Stokes v. City of Chicago, 744 F.
Supp. 183, 184-85 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (referring to arrestee's allegations that police officers suborned perjury in state court
proceedings).
Eleventh Circuit: Heichelbech v. Evans, 798 F. Supp. 708, 710
(M.D. Ga. 1992) (challenging refusal to discharge voluntary mental
patient without consent of his guardian), afftd, 995 F.2d 237 (11th
Cir. 1993).
Published decisions of the district courts using the Legalist
Model are:
Second Circuit: Lichtler v. County of Orange, 813 F. Supp. 1054,
1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (suing county for injuries suffered by school
children in tornado and wind storm); Nu-Life Constr. Corp. v.
Board of Educ., 809 F. Supp. 171,174-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing contractor's claims of injuries caused by school board authorities after contractor revealed alleged scheme by school to extort
kickbacks from him); Morello v. James, 797 F. Supp. 223, 224
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing action by prisoner to receive damages
for loss of his legal brief); East Coast Novelty Co. v. City of New
York, 781 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (seeking damages for
destruction of fireworks); Simmons v. Chemung County Dep't of
Social Servs., 770 F. Supp. 795, 796-97 (W.D.N.Y.) (noting challenge by owners and operators of day care center and center's employees of investigation into allegations of possible sexual abuse at
center), aftd, 948 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1991); Saraceno v. City of
Utica, 733 F. Supp. 538, 540 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (explaining charge by
municipal water board employee of constructive discharge).
Fourth Circuit: Biser v. Town of Bel Air, 778 F. Supp. 249, 252
(D. Md. 1991) (tracing landowner's complaints regarding delays in
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approval of special exception permits), affd on other grounds, 991
F.2d 100, 101 (4th Cir. 1993).
Fifth Circuit: Boston v. Lafayette County, 743 F. Supp. 462, 46468 (N.D. Miss. 1990) (suing county for mentally ill person's death
in jail).
Sixth Circuit: Harrington v. Grayson, 811 F. Supp. 1221, 1223
(E.D. Mich. 1993) (suing warden for inadequate medical treatment); Fitzpatrick v. Meyer, 809 F. Supp. 1299, 1301-02 (S.D. Ohio
1992) (challenging deputy sheriff's freezing of records of group
home for mentally retarded); Fitzpatrick v. Meyer, 809 F. Supp.
1292, 1293-95 (S.D. Ohio) (discussing Parratt/Hudsondoctrine in
same case, but with respect to claims against second group of defendants); Neal v. Miller, 778 F. Supp. 378, 379-82 (W.D. Mich.
1991) (seeking damages after prisoner struck by prison guard);
United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 768 F. Supp. 613, 614
(W.D. Mich. 1990) (challenging rebidding of state insurance contract), rev'd on other grounds, 960 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1992); Fisher v.
City of Cincinnati, 753 F. Supp. 681, 683-85 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (alleging police cover-up of officer's intoxication).
Seventh Circuit: Scott v. McCaughtry, 810 F. Supp. 1015, 101617 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (seeking damages for violations against former
inmate at disciplinary hearing and program review hearing); Stewart v. McGinnis, 800 F. Supp. 604, 605-06 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (complaining of destruction of inmate's property); Sturdevant v.
Haferman, 798 F. Supp. 536, 538 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (alleging prison
officials failed to give him adequate notice before disciplinary hearings); Universal Sec. Ins. Co. v. Koefoed, 775 F. Supp. 240, 241-43
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (complaining that state insurance department official carried out personal vendetta to injure insurance companies'
personal and business reputations and to interfere with business
activities); Ferguson v. McCaughtry, 774 F. Supp. 534, 535 (E.D.
Wis. 1991) (claiming deprivation of money orders and audio tapes
by prison guard); Weber v. Village of Hanover Park, 768 F. Supp.
630, 632-33 (N.D. I11. 1991) (complaining of beating during arrest);
Jones v. Doria, 767 F. Supp. 1432, 1433-34 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (challenging unilateral suspension and termination of deputy sheriff's
job by sheriff); Duenas v. Nagle, 765 F. Supp. 1393, 1395-96 (W.D.
Wis. 1991) (alleging failure to provide complainant with notice of
charges, opportunity to select witnesses, and reasons for
discipline).
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Ninth Circuit: Witte v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 787 F. Supp.
907, 907-08 (D. Alaska 1992) (challenging award of promotion to
another employee after it was allegedly promised to complaining
employee).
Tenth Circuit: Hartwick v. Board of Trustees, 782 F. Supp. 1507,
1508 (D. Kan. 1992) (challenging failure to renew tenured teacher's
contract).
The only published decision of the district courts using the Governmental Model in dictum is:
First Circuit: Ginaitt v. Haronian, 806 F. Supp. 311, 312-14
(D.R.I. 1992) (challenging revocation of fireman's pension).
Published decisions of the district courts using the Legalist
Model in dicta are:
Second Circuit: Acevedo v. Surles, 778 F. Supp. 179, 180-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (challenging established state procedure of setting
off treatment charges whenever patient files claim against state);
Conrad v. County of Onondaga Examining Bd. for Plumbers, 758
F. Supp. 824, 825-27 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (challenging alleged failure
to administer fair examination for master plumber's certificate,
although opportunity to re-take examination provided due
process).
Third Circuit: McArdle v. Tronetti, 769 F. Supp. 188, 189 (W.D.
Pa. 1991) (challenging sentence for disorderly conduct), affd, 961
F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1992); Envirotech Sanitary Sys., Inc. v. Shoener,
745 F. Supp. 271, 273-74 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (alleging violations in
processing of application for solid waste disposal permit for municipal waste landfill).
Sixth Circuit: Pesek v. City of Brunswick, 794 F. Supp. 768, 77376 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (challenging suspension of firefighter based
on attempt to speak at city council meeting).
Seventh Circuit: Saffold v. City of Chicago, 775 F. Supp. 1126,
1127-28 (N.D. I11. 1991) (disputing forfeiture of earned but unused
vacation time by police officers); Turner v. Chicago Hous. Auth.,
771 F. Supp. 924, 925 (7th Cir.) (N.D. Ill. 1991) (reconsidering summary judgment on substantive due process claim brought by public
housing tenants because of criminal conduct by tenants' sons), vacated on other grounds, 969 F.2d 461, 462-63 (7th Cir. 1992); Scott
v. O'Grady, 760 F. Supp. 1288, 1291-92 (N.D. I11. 1991) (suing
under § 1983 for eviction from mortgaged property after foreclo-
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sure), affid on other grounds, 975 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied 113 S. Ct. 2421 (1993).
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APPENDIX IV
Unpublished decisions of the district courts using the Governmental Model are:
First Circuit: Edmondson v. City of Boston, No. CIV.A.89-0395,
1990 WL 235426, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 1990) (suing city and
police officials on behalf of ward who went into coma after she was
left alone in police car and crashed it).
Third Circuit: McDaniels v. Flick, No. CIV.A.92-0932, 1993 WL
171270, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 1993) (challenging discharge after
tenured professor allegedly sexually harassed student); Buclary v.
Borough of Northampton, No. CIV.A.90-7950, 1991 WL 133851, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 17, 1991) (alleging improper denial of employment as police officers).
Fourth Circuit: Dionne v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. CIV.A.HAR
91-1770, 1992 WL 373149, at *1, (D. Md. Oct. 8, 1992) (challenging
termination of employment).
Seventh Circuit: Caroll v. County of Cook, No. 90 C 760, 1992
WL 346414, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1992) (complaining of refusal
to permit deputy sheriff to return to work after injury pending psychological evaluation); Crownhart v. Thorp, No. 92 C 20227, 1992
WL 332298, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 1992) (alleging city and police
officials deprived towing company owner of towing referrals); Littlejohn v. Village of Roscoe, No. 90-C-20298, 1992 WL 70336, at *1
(N.D. Ill. March 24, 1992) (litigating termination by defendants
who failed to follow procedures required by employee handbook
and Illinois statute); Watson v. Hardiman, No. 86 C 8804, 1990 WL
207358, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1990) (attacking actions of Director of County resulting in suspension of plaintiffs without pay);
Armstrong v. St. Joseph County Dep't of Welfare, No. CIV.S82-24,
1990 WL 212390, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 1990) (complaining of
discrimination in termination of employment); McGee v. Bauer,
No. 86 C 5273, 1990 WL 114470, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1990)
(challenging detention at police station and temporary termination
of utility services at home after police found dead animals in
home); Catanzaro v. Board of Trustees, No. 90 C 2303, 1990 WL
77893, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 1990) (litigating board's action relieving college president of his duties and barring him from
campus).
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Unpublished decisions of the district courts using the Legalist
Model are:
Second Circuit: Ludd v. Rockville Centre Union Free Sch. Dist.,
No. CV-86-2413(RR), 1990 WL 137388, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
1990) (challenging termination as principal).
Third Circuit: Carrigan v. Guz, No. CIV.A.92-4472, 1993 WL
90398, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 1993) (claiming deprivation of funds
in inmate account); WVCH Communications, Inc. v. Upper Providence Township, No. CIV.A.92-CV-5755, 1992 WL 398374, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1992) (challenging refusal of city to rezone
property).
Seventh Circuit: Sweeney v. Bausman, No. 88 C 20370, 1992 WL
390773, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 1992) (claiming unconstitutional
termination of deputy sheriff); Boalbey v. Whiteside County Bd.,
No. 92 C 20040, 1992 WL 373038, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1992)
(challenging demolition of building); Rita v. O'Grady, No. 87 C
2540, 1992 WL 80520, at *1 (N.D. Ill. April 10, 1992) (alleging that
sheriff's department employees were discharged, demoted, transferred, or forced to resign without due process); Kirby v. O'Keefe,
No. 91 C 119, 1991 WL 476393, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 24, 1991)
(alleging guilty finding of battery on another inmate occurred without due process when hearing officer relied on unverified information from confidential informant); Brown v. O'Grady, No. 90 C
4136, 1991 WL 98965, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1991) (litigating termination of sheriff's department employees); Stover v. City of Northlake, No. 90 C 4829, 1991 WL 86105, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 15,
1991) (suing over suspension and termination of police officer);
Best v. Special Educ. Dist., No. 89 C 8951, 1990 WL 205949, at *1*2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 1990) (alleging deprivation of property without
due process when district, contrary to agreement, gave negative
recommendations of employee); Asllani v. Board of Educ., No. 90
C 2149, 1990 WL 165644, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1990) (challenging suspension of school principal); Zegar v. Lattimer, No. 89 C
3016, 1990 WL 165305, at *1-*4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 1990) (suing over
employee termination).
Ninth Circuit: Gomes v. Marshall, No. C 93-0100 BAC, 1993
WL 96472, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 1993) (alleging prisoner deprived of television without due process); Hammer v. King, No.
CS-09-0023-JBH, 1990 WL 117868, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 6, 1990)
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(complaining that prison officials removed deer antlers and other
items used in religious ceremonies without due process).
Tenth Circuit: Jackson v. Geier, No. CIV.A.91-2041-V, 1991 WL
278625, at *2-*4 (D. Kan. Dec. 24, 1991) (challenging improper
arrest and detention).
Eleventh Circuit: Angle v. Dow, No. CIV.A.92-0344-AH-C,
1993 WL 189023, at *1 (S.D. Ala. June 1, 1993) (challenging police
officer's termination) (subsequently published in 822 F. Supp. 1530
(S.D. Ala. 1993)).
The only unpublished district court decision using the Governmental Model in dictum is:
Sixth Circuit: Herndon v. Johnson, No. 88-CV-70907-DT, 1992
WL 152713, at *1-*18 (E.D. Mich. April 7, 1992) (challenging major misconduct ticket given prison inmate).
No unpublished district court decision used the Legalist Model
in dictum.

